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Abstract
In this thesis I characterise an optimal procurement contract for a government
that purchases a good or service from a firm that has private information
about its cost of production (its type) when the government has available the
reports of a corruptible internal auditor and an honest but less well informed
external auditor.
In chapter 2 I assume that the government is constrained to offer the
internal auditor a contract that consists of a penalty if the external auditor
obtains evidence of misreporting. For the case of two cost types I show that an
optimal contract exhibits a separation property: the government gives priority
to achieving the first best (no private information) expected profit scheme over
demanding the first best quantity scheme. For the case of a continuum of cost
types I provide sufficient conditions under which this result is valid.
In chapter 3 I allow the government to offer the internal auditor a contract
that consists of a transfer, a reimbursement and a penalty. For the situation
in which bribery takes place after the firm makes a claim about its type I
demonstrate that the government can achieve the outcome of the first best
contract if the sum of the expected penalties is positive and for every type of
the firm the distribution of the outcome of the audit is not the same as that
of the adjacent type. For the situation in which bribery takes place before the
firm makes a claim about its type I argue that the contract design problem is
the same as in chapter 2 and I prove that if the sum of the expected penalties
does not depend on the extent of the misreporting then in an optimal contract
bribery does not take place.
vii
Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Motivation and research questions
It has long been recognized that governments have less accurate information
about the cost of production of goods and services than the firms that supply
them. Faced with this asymmetry of information, an optimal strategy for a
government is to commit to a transfer scheme and a quantity scheme that
induces a firm to make a truthful claim about its private information. As the
interests of the government and the firm generally do not coincide, this second
best contract fails to achieve the outcome of the first best contract that the
government would offer if it had the same information as the firm (see Baron
and Myerson (1982)).
To support the government, an audit agency (henceforth referred as an
auditor) is often charged with gathering the information correlated with the
cost of production of the firm that becomes available after production takes
place. By requiring a reimbursement that is contingent on the report of the
auditor about the outcome of the audit, the government can then alter the
incentive of the firm to make a truthful claim about its private information.
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This allows the government to approximate or even attain the outcome of its
first best contract (see Baron and Besanko (1984) and Riordan and Sappington
(1988)). As an illustration, the Defense Contract Audit Agency performs
audits for the U.S. Department of Defense. In the financial year 2011 it
“examined over $128 billion in defense contractor costs and issued over 7,000
audit reports. These reports recommended $11.9 billion in cost reductions”
(see U.S. Department of Defense (2012, page 2)).
A major concern in the design of government contracts is that the firm,
having observed the outcome of the audit, attempts to bribe the auditor to
misreport it. This misreporting undermines the informativeness of auditing
information, as it distorts the correlation between the private information of
the firm and the report of the auditor. The government often tries to prevent
it by making contracting between the firm and the auditor illegal, so that they
cannot appeal to a court of law to enforce a bribery agreement. Nevertheless,
when the auditor is industry specific, the repeated interaction between the
auditor and the firm might make a bribery agreement enforceable through a
reputation mechanism (see Tirole (1992) and Martimort (1999)).
The common institutional response to the threat of bribery is then to
verify the report of the internal (industry specific) auditor with that of
an external (non sectoral) auditor that is less prone to bribery due to its
limited relationship with the firm. If the external auditor obtains evidence
of misreporting then the government requests that the firm and the internal
auditor pay a penalty. For the case of the Defense Contract Audit Agency,
the external auditing is performed by the Government Accountability Office.
Examples of other organisations that play the role of an external auditor
include the National Audit Office in the U.K., the Bundesrechnungshof in
Germany and the Cour des Comptes in France.
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In this thesis I characterise an optimal procurement contract for a
government that purchases a good or service from a firm that has private
information about its cost of production when the government has available the
reports of a corruptible internal auditor and an honest but less well informed
external auditor. More precisely, I provide answers to the following questions:
1) What quantity does the government demand? 2) When does the government
require a reimbursement and what amount does it request? 3) What expected
profit does the firm make?
1.2 Methodology and structure of the thesis
The methodology that I employ to characterise an optimal procurement
contract is due to Tirole (1986) and it consists of two steps. Applied to the
contract design problem under consideration, it proceeds as follows: In the
first step take as given the contract that the government offers to the firm and
the internal auditor and determine the bribery agreement that the firm offers
to the internal auditor. In the second step treat the optimal bribery agreement
as a constraint in the contract design problem of the government and optimise
to find the contract that the government offers to the firm and the internal
auditor.
The fundamental assumption in the methodology that I have just described
is that the bribery agreement (henceforth referred as the side contract) is
enforceable even if it is illegal. The benefit of this assumption is that it allows
the use of optimization theory to determine first the optimal side contract
and then the optimal contract that the government offers to the firm and
the internal auditor. Tirole argues that an alternative, more fundamental
approach, that does not employ this assumption “traces the foundations
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of enforceability to repeated interaction and reputation” (see Tirole (1992,
page 156)). This approach requires the use of relatively complex techniques
(dynamic mechanism design with incentive constraints defined by equilibria
of a repeated game). The fact that many of the lessons obtained with the
enforceable approach seem to remain valid for this approach has led most
research on bribery to discard it (see Martimort (1999) for an exception).
As a preliminary step to determine an optimal side contract, it is necessary
to specify the contract that the government offers to the firm and the internal
auditor. I assume for the entire thesis that the government offers a contract to
the firm that consists of a transfer, a quantity, a reimbursement and a penalty.
The transfer and the quantity depend on the claim of the firm about its type.
The reimbursement depends on the claims of the firm about its type and about
the outcome of the audit and on the report of the internal auditor. The firm
pays the penalty if the external auditor obtains evidence of misreporting.
In chapter 2 I assume that the government is constrained to offer the
internal auditor a contract that consists of a penalty if the external auditor
obtains evidence of misreporting. I refer to this contract as non contingent.
The benefit of restricting attention to a non contingent contract for the internal
auditor is that there is no need to consider a side contract that is contingent on
the claims of the firm, as the payoff of the internal auditor does not depend on
them. The only relevant side contract consists of the firm requesting a report
from the internal auditor and paying a bribe if the internal auditor complies
with the request.
In chapter 3 I allow the government to offer the internal auditor a contract
that consists of a transfer, a reimbursement and a penalty that are a function of
the same contingencies as the transfer, the reimbursement and the penalty that
the government offers to the firm. I refer to this contract as contingent. The
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consideration of a contingent contract for the internal auditor leads to several
possible side contracts, depending on the contracting variables. I assume that
the firm can offer the internal auditor a side contract that includes the claims
of the firm from the point in time at which the offer takes place and the
report of the internal auditor. I then consider two possible situations. In the
first situation side contracting takes place after the firm makes a claim about
its private information (so the side contract is not contingent on this claim)
but before it makes a claim about the outcome of the audit. In the second
situation side contracting takes place before the firm makes a claim about its
private information. I refer to these two situations as ex post and ex ante side
contracting respectively.
1.3 Preview of the results
1.3.1 Preview of the results in chapter 2
If the government offers the internal auditor a non contingent contract then an
optimal side contract for the firm consists of paying a zero bribe if it requests
the internal auditor to report truthfully and a bribe equal to the expected
penalty that the internal auditor pays otherwise. The contract design problem
is then as if the firm controls the report of the internal auditor at a cost of
misreporting equal to the sum of the expected penalties.1
I first characterise an optimal contract for the case in which the private
information of the firm (henceforth referred as its type) takes two possible
values, with a low value denoting a lower cost of production than a high value
for any given quantity. In that situation the contract design problem consists
1I initially assume that the firm and the internal auditor are risk neutral. In section 2.7
I discuss how the results differ if either or both of them are risk averse.
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of determining how to optimally prevent the firm when its type is low from
claiming that it is high.
In Proposition 1 I show that for the case of two cost types the government
requires a reimbursement when the firm claims that its type is high if and only
if the outcome of the audit is more likely to occur when the type of the firm is
low than when it is high. The reimbursement is not greater than the sum of
the expected penalties, so that misreporting does not take place. If the audit
is sufficiently informative of the type of the firm or the sum of the expected
penalties is sufficiently high then the government offers a contract that results
in the first best (no private information) expected profit scheme and quantity
scheme. Otherwise an optimal contract exhibits a separation property: the
government gives priority to achieving the first best expected profit scheme
over demanding the first best quantity scheme.
I then characterise an optimal contract for the case in which the type of
the firm takes a continuum of possible values. This is a more complex task
than the previous one, as it requires determining how to optimally prevent the
firm from making a false claim for each possible type. I proceed in two steps,
each ending with a proposition.
In Proposition 2 I focus on how to optimally prevent the firm from
marginally exaggerating its type. I provide a sufficient condition under which
the logic of Proposition 1 remains valid. More precisely, if this condition is
satisfied then the government requires a reimbursement for any claim of the
firm about its type if and only if the outcome of the audit is more likely to
occur when the type of the firm is marginally lower than the type that the
firmed claimed to have. Misreporting does not take place and the government
gives priority to achieving the first best expected profit scheme over achieving
the first best quantity scheme.
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In Proposition 3 I then provide sufficient conditions under which preventing
the firm from marginally exaggerating its type implies preventing the firm
from making a false claim about its type. This ensures that the contract that
I characterise in my second proposition is an optimal contract.
1.3.2 Preview of the results in chapter 3
If the government offers the internal auditor a contingent contract then the
government can ensure that the internal auditor reports truthfully when it
rejects an ex post side contract by requiring a reimbursement from the internal
auditor that is not contingent on its report. As a result, in an optimal ex post
side contract the firm pays the internal auditor a zero bribe if it requests
the internal auditor to report truthfully and a bribe equal to the difference
in reimbursement plus the expected penalty that the internal auditor pays
otherwise. The contract design problem is then as if the firm selects its
claim about the outcome of the audit and the report of the internal auditor
to minimise the sum of the reimbursements plus the sum of the expected
penalties.
In Proposition 4 I demonstrate that when side contracting takes place ex
post the government can achieve the outcome of the first best contract if the
sum of the expected penalties is positive and for every type of the firm the
distribution of the outcome of the audit is not the same as that of the adjacent
type.2 The government offers the firm a reimbursement scheme that prevents
the firm from making a false claim for the first best quantity scheme and
expected profit scheme. The government ensures that bribery does not take
place by giving the internal auditor the reimbursement that the firm pays. This
is not costly for the government as for every type of the firm the government
2For the case of a continuum of types this proposition involves some of the conditions in
Proposition 3.
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pays the internal auditor a transfer equal to the expected reimbursement that
the internal auditor pays.
If the government offers the internal auditor a contingent contract and side
contracting takes place ex ante I assume that the internal auditor observes
the type of the firm. This assumption ensures that in an optimal ex ante
side contract the firm pays the internal auditor an expected bribe such that
the expected payoff of the internal auditor is the same as if it rejects the
side contract. The contract design problem is then as if the firm selects its
claims about its type and about the outcome of the audit and the report of
the internal auditor to maximise the sum of their expected payoffs.
The claims and the report that the firm selects with ex ante side contracting
depend on the sum of the transfers and the sum of the reimbursements but not
on how they add up. Therefore with ex ante side contracting it is optimal for
the government to offer the internal auditor a non contingent contract. The
contract design problem is then as in chapter 2: the firm controls the report of
the internal auditor at a cost of misreporting equal to the sum of the expected
penalties. An optimal contract is then given by Proposition 1 for the case of
two cost types and by Propositions 2 and 3 for the case of a continuum of cost
types. I employ this section to address a question that I ignored in chapter 2:
whether bribery takes place in an optimal contract.
In Proposition 5 I prove that if the sum of the expected penalties that
the firm and the internal auditor pay is independent of the extent of the
misreporting then the government can achieve the optimal quantity scheme
and expected profit scheme of a contract for which bribery takes place with
a contract for which bribery does not take place. As bribery is costly for the
government, it is then optimal for the government to deter it. This result is
valid regardless of the the distribution of the outcome of the audit and of the
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belief of the government about the type of the firm.
1.4 Relationship with existing research
1.4.1 Auditing and bribery
Research on auditing and bribery began with the work of Tirole (1986) on the
formation of coalitions in hierarchies. Tirole argued that “behaviour is often
best predicted by the analysis of group as well as individual incentives” (see
Tirole (1986, page 181)). To illustrate this idea, Tirole developed a principal,
supervisor and agent model that is applicable to a wide variety of situations
(including procurement). The agent (the firm) is the productive unit, with a
privately known productivity (its type) that takes two possible values. The
principal (the government) receives an output equal to the sum of the type of
the agent and its unobservable effort. The supervisor (the auditor) observes
either the type of the agent or nothing. In the former case the agent can bribe
the supervisor to report that it has observed nothing.
Tirole characterised the optimal contract that the principal offers to the
agent and the supervisor. He showed that this contract prevents bribery but
it does not achieve the same outcome as when bribery is not an issue. His
analysis is the basis of the two articles on auditing and bribery that are most
closely related to the research in this thesis. I discuss each of them in turn.3
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) introduced the distinction between a
corruptible internal auditor and an honest external auditor that I employ in
this thesis. They analysed a contract design problem that features a principal,
3Armstrong and Sappington (2007) and Dal Bo (2006) surveyed research on auditing
and bribery in the context of regulation. Mookherjee (2006) performed the same task in
the context of organisational design, with a focus on whether decentralisation is an optimal
response to bribery.
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an agent with a privately known productivity (its type), an internal auditor
and a costly external auditor. As in the model of Tirole, the type of the agent
takes two possible values and the principal receives an output equal to the sum
of the type of the agent and its unobservable effort. The agent and the internal
auditor observe the outcome of an audit that takes two possible values. The
principal pays the internal auditor a reward if the agent claims that its type
is low and the internal auditor reports the outcome of the audit that is more
likely to occur when the type of the agent is high. The agent can bribe the
internal auditor to misreport the outcome of the audit. The external auditor
observes the same outcome of the audit as the internal auditor if it exerts
a positive effort and it observes nothing otherwise. If the external auditor
reports a different outcome of the audit than the internal auditor then the
agent and the internal auditor pay a penalty.
Kofman and Lawaree concentrated on characterising the optimal trade off
between the cost of hiring the external auditor and the benefit of employing
its report to eliminate the threat of bribery. By contrast, I assume that the
external auditor is as costly as the internal auditor but less well informed and
I focus on obtaining an optimal contract under more general assumptions than
theirs. My analysis is broader than theirs in three aspects. First, I consider
the case of a continuum of types and I provide sufficient conditions under
which an optimal contract has the same structure as for the case of two types
(Propositions 2 and 3). Second, in chapter 3 I let the government offer a
contingent contract to the internal auditor and I clarify the conditions under
which this contract achieves the outcome of the first best contract (Proposition
4). Third, I allow the outcome of the audit to take an arbitrary (but finite)
number of possible values and I characterise when bribery does not take place
in an optimal contract (Proposition 5).
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Bac and Kucuksenel (2006) emphasised the distinction between ex post
and ex ante side contracting. They extended the model of Tirole (1986) by
assuming that the supervisor has to exert an unobservable effort to obtain its
information. They then allowed the agent to offer the supervisor an ex ante
side contract that consists of a bribe in exchange for the commitment of the
supervisor to not monitor.
Bac and Kucuksenel were interested in how ex ante side contracting affects
the optimal contract with ex post side contracting that Tirole characterised.
They found that if monitoring costs are small and the probability of detection is
large then the optimal contract with ex post side contracting remains optimal.
My definition of ex ante side contracting (given in section 1.2) differs from
theirs and as a result their conclusions do not apply. In particular, assuming
that auditing is costless I find that ex ante side contracting leads to a strictly
worse outcome for the government than ex post side contracting unless the
audit is sufficiently informative of the type of the firm or the sum of the
expected penalties is sufficiently high (Propositions 4 and 5).
1.4.2 Auditing and costly misreporting
Research on auditing with costly misreporting does not consider bribery
explicitly and instead assumes that the agent controls the report of the auditor
at a cost of misreporting. Several articles following this approach have more
general assumptions on the distribution of the type of the agent than the
research that I discussed in the previous subsection. They are then more
relevant to understand my result that in an an optimal contract bribery does
not take place if the expected penalties that the firm and the internal auditor
pay are independent of the extent of the misreporting (Proposition 5). I now
describe the two articles on auditing with costly misreporting that are most
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closely related to the research in this thesis.
Laffont and Tirole (1986) provided the most well known analysis on
auditing with costly misreporting in the context of procurement. They studied
a model in which a government contracts with a firm for the production of a
good or service. The firm has a privately known efficiency parameter (its type)
that takes a continuum of possible values. Before production takes place, the
firm can exert an unobservable effort that reduces its expected average cost
below its type. The government offers the firm a contract that consists of
a transfer, a quantity and a reimbursement. The transfer and the quantity
are a function of the claim of the firm about its type while the reimbursement
depends on the previous claim and on the cost of production of the firm, which
the government observes.
The effort that the firm exerts in the model of Laffont and Tirole can
be seen as an action that leads to the misreporting of the expected average
cost of the firm. The fundamental difference between effort in the model of
Laffont and Tirole and bribery in my model is that effort lowers the cost of
production of the firm whereas bribery does not. It is then not surprising that
Laffont and Tirole found that the optimal contract induces the firm to exert a
positive amount of effort whereas I find that bribery does not take place in an
optimal contract. What might come as a surprise is that my result requires the
condition that the expected penalties that the firm and the internal auditor
pay are independent of the extent of the misreporting. To explain the need
for this condition I turn to the next article.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) considered a procurement model with
auditing and costly misreporting that it closest to mine with respect to the
payoffs of the principal and the agent and the information that they observe.
The agent produces a good or service for the principal. The agent has a
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privately known marginal cost (its type) that takes a continuum of possible
values. After production takes place, an audit results in a signal that has a one
to one relationship with the type of the agent. The agent can then distort it by
performing a costly action before the principal observes a report about it. The
principal offers the agent a contract that consists of a transfer, a quantity and
a reimbursement. The transfer and the quantity are a function of the claim
of the agent about its type. The principal requests a zero reimbursement if
the report is the one that it anticipates given the claim of the agent about its
type. Otherwise the principal requests an arbitrarily high reimbursement.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare demonstrated that in their model misreporting
takes place in an optimal contract if there is no fixed cost of misreporting and
the variable cost is convex. The reason is that by tolerating misreporting the
principal makes it costlier for the agent to make a false claim about its type.
This allows the principal to reduce the transfer that it pays the agent when it
makes a truthful claim. I do not assume that the outcome of the audit has a
one to one relationship with the type of the firm so the result of Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare does not apply to my analysis.
1.4.3 Auditing and constraints on payments
Research on auditing with constraints on payments characterises an optimal
contract under the assumption that the reimbursement that the principal
requests from the agent has an upper bound due to either legal restrictions or
limited liability. Several articles following this approach consider the case of a
continuum of types and have more general assumptions on the distribution of
the outcome of the audit than those articles that I discussed in the two previous
subsections. They are then more relevant to understand my characterisation
of an optimal contract with a continuum of types (Propositions 2 and 3). I
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now describe the two articles on auditing with constraints on payments that
are most closely related to the research in this thesis.
Baron and Besanko (1984) presented the most general characterisation of
an optimal contract with auditing and constraints on payments in the context
of regulation. They considered a model in which a government regulates the
fixed fee and the unit price that a firm charges to its customers. The firm
has private information (its type) that takes a continuum of possible values
and is correlated with its cost, which the government observes if it hires an
auditor. The government offers the firm a contract that consists of a fixed fee,
a unit price and a reimbursement. The fixed fee and the price are a function
of the claim of the firm about its type while the reimbursement depends on
the previous claim and on the cost of production of the firm if the government
hires an auditor. The government is restricted to request a reimbursement not
greater than a legally specified amount.
Baron and Besanko proved the Maximum Punishment Principle: the
government requests the highest possible reimbursement for any claim of the
firm about its type if and only if the outcome of the audit is more likely to
occur when the type of the firm is marginally lower than the type that the firm
claimed to have. In my analysis the highest possible optimal reimbursement
is a function of how well informed the external auditor is. In addition, to
provide the remaining characterisation of how to optimally prevent the firm
from marginally exaggerating its type (Proposition 2) I do not assume a specific
distribution of the outcome of the audit whereas they assumed a normal
distribution. Also, I am able to provide sufficient conditions under which
preventing the firm from marginally exaggerating its type implies preventing
the firm from making a false claim about its type (Proposition 3) whereas they
only provided an example where this is true for some parameter configurations.
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Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (2006) studied a model of procurement in which
a government contracts with a firm for the production of a good or service.
The firm has private information (its type) that takes a continuum of possible
values and is correlated with its cost, which the government observes. The
government offers the firm a contract that consists of a transfer, a quantity
and a reimbursement. The transfer and the quantity are a function of the claim
of the firm about its type while the reimbursement depends on the previous
claim and on the cost of production of the firm. The government is restricted
to request a reimbursement such that the expected profit of the firm is not
lower than its liability.
Gary-Bobo and Spiegel established sufficient conditions under which the
government can achieve the outcome of the first best contract in their model.
Unlike Baron and Besanko, they did not restrict attention to a particular
distribution of the outcome of the audit. However, they incorrectly argued
that limited liability makes it optimal for the government to request the
highest possible reimbursement for all the outcomes of the audit except the
outcome that is most likely for the type that the firm claimed to have. More
precisely, they ignored that with limited liability there is a trade off between
requiring a reimbursement for as many outcomes as possible to request an
amount below the limited liability of the firm and requiring a reimbursement
for those outcomes of the audit that are more likely to occur for a marginally
higher type to prevent the firm from marginally exaggerating its type. As a
result of this omission, their characterisation of an optimal contract with a
continuum of types substantially differs from mine.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Procurement with a
Non Contingent Contract for
the Internal Auditor
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I characterise an optimal procurement contract for a
government that purchases a good or service from a firm that has private
information about its cost of production when the government has available the
reports of a corruptible internal auditor and an honest but less well informed
external auditor.1 I do so assuming that the government is constrained to offer
the internal auditor a contract that consists of a penalty if the external auditor
obtains evidence of misreporting. In that situation, an optimal side contract
for the firm consists of paying a zero bribe if it requests the internal auditor to
report truthfully and a bribe equal to the expected penalty that the internal
auditor pays otherwise.2 The contract design problem is then as if the firm
1For an example of this contract design problem see section 1.1.
2For a discussion of contracting and side contracting in this thesis see section 1.2.
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controls the report of the internal auditor at a cost of misreporting equal to
the sum of the expected penalties that the firm and the internal auditor pay
if the external auditor obtains evidence of misreporting.
I first characterise an optimal contract for the case in which the cost type
of the firm takes two possible values, with a low value denoting a lower cost of
production than a high value for any given quantity. In Proposition 1 I show
that, in order to prevent the firm when its type is low from claiming that it
is high, the government requires a reimbursement when the firm claims that
its type is high if and only if the outcome of the audit is more likely to occur
when the type of the firm is low than when it is high. The reimbursement is
not greater than the sum of the expected penalties, so that misreporting does
not take place. If the audit is sufficiently informative of the type of the firm
or the sum of the expected penalties is sufficiently high then the government
offers a contract that results in the first best (no private information) expected
profit scheme and quantity scheme. Otherwise an optimal contract exhibits
a separation property: the government gives priority to achieving the first
expected profit when the type of the firm is low over demanding the first best
quantity when the type of the firm is high.3
To evaluate the robustness of the previous results I consider the case of a
continuum of cost types. In order to characterise an optimal contract I follow
the differential approach to contracting of Laffont and Maskin (1980): First
I obtain a differential constraint that is necessary to prevent the firm from
marginally exaggerating its type. Then I characterise an optimal contract in
the contract design problem that results from replacing the constraint that
3If an audit is not available then it is well known that the government demands the first
best quantity when the type of the firm is low and a second best quantity below the first
best quantity when the type of the firm is high. The firm makes the first best expected
profit when its type is high and a second best expected profit above the first best expected
profit when its type is low (see Baron and Myerson (1982)).
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the firm makes a truthful claim about its type with the differential constraint
(henceforth referred as the relaxed problem). Finally I verify that an optimal
contract in the relaxed problem satisfies the constraint that the firm makes a
truthful claim about its type and is therefore an optimal contract.
In Proposition 2 I provide a sufficient condition under which the logic of
Proposition 1 remains valid for the relaxed problem. More precisely, if this
condition is satisfied then in an optimal contract the government requires a
reimbursement for any claim of the firm about its type if and only if the
outcome of the audit is more likely to occur when the type of the firm is
marginally lower than the type that the firmed claimed to have. Misreporting
does not take place and an optimal contract exhibits a separation property: for
every type of the firm the government gives priority to achieving the first best
marginal difference in expected profit over demanding the first best quantity.
In Proposition 3 I address a common difficulty of auditing models with more
than two types: requiring that the payoff of the firm has the Spence-Mirrlees
property does not suffice to verify that an optimal contract in the relaxed
problem satisfies the constraint that the firm makes a truthful claim about its
type.4 I first specify a property of the distribution of the outcome of the audit
that allows me to write the constraint that the firm makes a truthful claim
about its type in terms of the functions that determine an optimal contract in
the relaxed problem. I then find conditions on these functions that ensure that
an optimal contract in the relaxed problem satisfies the resulting constraint.
I illustrate the feasibility of these conditions with a simple example that has
a clear economic interpretation.
4The Spence-Mirrlees property in this setup states that the marginal rate of substitution
between the quantity that the firm produces and the money that it receives is monotonic in
its type (see Laffont and Martimort (2002, Appendix 3.3)). If, as I assume, the firm has a
payoff that is linear in the money that it receives then the property is satisfied if and only
if the marginal cost of the firm is monotonic in its type.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: In the next section I describe the
model under consideration and in section 2.3 I present the benchmark case in
which the government observes the type of the firm. After this, in section 2.4
I provide the mathematical statement of the contract design problem together
with two preliminary results that play a key role in the characterisation of
an optimal contract. Subsequently, in section 2.5 I characterise an optimal
contract for the case of two cost types and in section 2.6 I perform the same
task for the case of a continuum of cost types. With the analysis completed, in
section 2.7 I conclude, discuss the relationship between my results and existing
research and comment on some possible extensions.5 Finally, in the appendix
I prove those results that do not follow directly from others.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Contracting parties and information structures
A government contracts with a firm for the production of a quantity q ≥ 0.
The firm has a cost of production of C(θ, q). The firm observes the actual
value of θ (henceforth referred as its type) whereas the government has a prior
belief about θ given by the probability function f(θ) which is positive for all
θ in Θ.
After the firm produces the quantity q, an internal auditor investigates the
cost of production. The audit results in an outcome s that takes one of the n
possible values in the finite set S = {s1, ..., sn}. The outcome s consists of data
correlated with the type of the firm. It can contain for example the number of
hours employed, the amount of inputs spent or the depreciation rate of assets
5For a preview of the relationship between the results in this thesis and existing research
see section 1.4.
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used per quantity produced. As auditing involves sampling procedures I allow
for an imperfect correlation between this information and the type of the firm.
I denote by g(s | θ) the probability of the outcome s conditional on the type
of the firm θ.
The firm and the internal auditor observe the outcome of the audit whereas
the government does not. The internal auditor presents to the government a
report sˆ ∈ S that might differ from the outcome of the audit (sˆ 6= s). This
misreporting can take the form of including in the report hours employed and
inputs spent in other projects or inflating the initial value of assets so that
their perceived depreciation seems higher than it actually is. The government
does not have the ability to distinguish a truthful report from a false one.
However, it has available the report σ of an honest external auditor. The
external auditor evaluates the veracity of the report of the internal auditor.
If the internal auditor misreports then the external auditor obtains evidence
against it σ = e with probability h and no evidence σ = ∅ otherwise. If the
internal auditor does not misreport then the external auditor never obtains
evidence against it.
2.2.2 Contracts
The contract that the government offers to the firm consists of a transfer t(θ˜) in
exchange for a quantity q(θ˜) and a reimbursement r(θ˜, s˜, sˆ). The firm selects
the claims θ˜ and s˜ from two message spaces Mθ and Ms after observing θ
and s respectively.
The side contract that the firm offers to the internal auditor consists of a
bribe b(s) and a report sˆ(s). The meaning of this side contract is that, when
the outcome of the audit is s, the firm pays the internal auditor the bribe b(s)
if the internal auditor reports sˆ(s). The side contract b(s) = 0 and sˆ(s) = s
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corresponds to no bribery.
If the external auditor detects misreporting then the firm and the internal
auditor pay respective penalties PF and PA. These penalties admit several non
exclusive interpretations. One interpretation is that they are the wealth of the
firm and the internal auditor that a court can seize. Another interpretation
is that they are the resulting loss of future rents for the firm and the internal
auditor or its members as a result of legal actions. In either case I assume that
the penalties are legally specified so the government has no choice over them.
2.2.3 Preferences
The payoff of the government when the firm produces a quantity q, the
government pays a transfer t and it receives a reimbursement r is U(q)− t+ r.
I assume that the utility U(q) is increasing, strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable and that it satisfies U(0) = 0 and dU(0)
dq
=∞.
The payoff (profit) of the firm when it produces a quantity q, it receives
a transfer t and it pays a bribe b, a reimbursement r and a penalty PF is
pi = t − b − r − PF − C(θ, q). I assume that C(θ, q) is increasing, convex
and twice continuously differentiable in q and it satisfies that C(θ, 0) = 0,
that C(θ, q) and dC(θ,q)
dq
are increasing in θ for q > 0 and that d2C(θ,q)
dq2 is non
decreasing in θ for q > 0.6
The payoff (profit) of the internal auditor when it receives a bribe b and
it pays a penalty PA is b − PA. The payoff of the external auditor does not
depend on the relationship with the other contracting parties.
The contracting parties are risk neutral. The firm and the internal auditor
6The assumption that C(θ, q) is differentiable in q at q = 0 rules out the existence of
a fixed cost of production. The purpose of this is to ensure that the government always
demands a positive quantity (given that U(0) = C(θ, 0) and that dU(0)dq = ∞). It is
possible to adjust the analysis to allow for a fixed cost of production by imposing additional
assumptions on the utility function that guarantee that the demand is always positive.
21
accept a contract if their expected payoff is greater or equal than their
reservation payoff, which I normalize to zero.
2.2.4 Timing
The timing of the contractual relationships is as follows:7
1. The firm observes θ.
2. The government offers a contract to the firm.
3. The firm makes a claim θ˜, produces a quantity q and receives a
transfer t.
4. The firm and the internal auditor observe s.
5. The firm offers a side contract to the internal auditor.
6. The firm makes a claim s˜ and the internal auditor reports sˆ. The firm
pays a reimbursement r and a bribe b.
7. The external auditor observes σ and reports. If it reports evidence of
misreporting then the firm and the internal auditor pay respective
penalties PF and PA.
2.3 The benchmark case
As a benchmark case for later use, I first consider the situation in which the
government observes the type of the firm. In that situation, the contract that
the government offers to the firm consists of a transfer t(θ) in exchange for a
7In this timing I do not mention what happens when the firm rejects the contract or the
internal auditor rejects the side contract as these are not optimal choices.
22
quantity q(θ). The payoff of the government is the utility of the quantity that
it demands minus the transfers that it pays. This is given by:
U(q(θ))− t(θ) (2.1)
The firm accepts the contract if:
pi(θ) = t(θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 (2.2)
An optimal contract maximises (2.1) subject to (2.2) for all θ. The optimal
transfer is equal to the cost of production so the firm makes a zero first best
expected profit:
piFB(θ) = 0 (2.3)
The government demands a first best quantity qFB (θ) that maximises the
surplus, defined as its utility minus the cost of production of the firm. The
quantity scheme is given by the condition that the marginal surplus is zero:
dU(qFB(θ))
dq
− dC(θ, q
FB(θ))
dq
= 0 (2.4)
2.4 The contract design problem
2.4.1 Statement of the problem
Returning to the situation in which the government does not observe the type
of the firm, I first focus on the side contract. The internal auditor reports
truthfully whenever it rejects the side contract to avoid paying a penalty.
This results in a payoff of zero. Therefore in any optimal side contract the
firm pays a zero bribe if it requests truthful reporting (b(s) = 0 if sˆ(s) = s,
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bribery does not take place) and a bribe equal to the expected penalty that
the internal auditor pays otherwise (b(s) = hPA if sˆ(s) 6= s). The contract
design problem is then as if the firm controls the report of the internal auditor
at a cost of misreporting equal to the sum of the expected penalties. In other
words, the contract design problem is a principal agent problem with hidden
information and hidden action.
In this setup the Revelation Principle of Myerson (1982) applies: there is
an optimal contract
{
q(θ˜), t(θ˜), r(θ˜, s˜, sˆ), sˆ(θ˜, s˜)
}
in which the message spaces
are the set of types and the set of outcomes of the audit (θ˜ ∈ Θ and s˜ ∈ S)
and in which the government makes a recommendation to the firm about what
report to request from the internal auditor (sˆ(θ˜, s˜)). Furthermore, this contract
is truthful (θ˜ = θ and s˜ = s) and obedient (sˆ = sˆ(θ˜, s˜)).
Before proceeding with the characterisation of the contract design problem,
it is worth pausing to comment on the role of the recommendation in the above
contract. What the recommendation captures is that for any contract the
government is aware of the types of the firm and the outcomes of the audit for
which bribery takes place and the resulting report. The purpose of considering
it is then to facilitate the characterisation of the contract design problem.
I next note that in the model under consideration obedience does not
impose any constraint: given the claims of the firm, the government can infer
whether the firm followed its recommendation or not. It can then require
an arbitrarily high reimbursement when the firm does not (r(θ˜, s˜, sˆ) = ∞ if
sˆ 6= sˆ(θ˜, s˜)). Therefore I can write the reimbursement as r(θ˜, s˜), where the
firm pays this reimbursement if the report of the internal auditor coincides
with the recommendation of the government.
In Chapter 3 I argue that, with the information structure of the external
auditor and the penalties that I have assumed, there is an optimal truthful
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contract for which the government recommends that the firm requests a
truthful report from the internal auditor for all the types of the firm and
all the outcomes of the audit (sˆ(θ, s) = s for all θ and all s). Using this result,
I refer to a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit as bribery not taking
place. I now state the contract design problem with a truthful contract for
which bribery does not take place.
The payoff of the government with a truthful contract for which bribery
does not take place is:
Ef(θ)
{
U(q(θ))− t (θ) + ∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)g(s | θ)
}
(2.5)
After the firm claims that its type is θ, when the outcome of the internal
audit is s bribery does not take place if:8
r(θ, s) ≤ r(θ, s˜) + hPA + hPF ∀s˜ 6= s (2.6)
If this condition holds for all the types of the firm and all the outcomes of
the audit then the firm prefers to make a truthful claim when its type is θ if:9
t (θ)−∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q (θ)) ≥ (2.7)
t(θ˜)−∑
s∈S
r(θ˜, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
and accepts the contract if:
pi (θ) = t (θ)−∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 (2.8)
8To simplify the presentation of my results I assume that when the firm is indifferent
between bribing and not bribing the internal auditor it chooses the latter.
9To simplify the presentation of my results I assume that when the firm is indifferent
between making a false claim about its type and making a truthful claim it chooses the
latter.
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An optimal contract maximises (2.5) subject to (2.6) for all θ and all s and
(2.7) and (2.8) for all θ.
2.4.2 Alternative statement of the problem
I now perform a change in variables that provides more intuition into the
contract design problem. I consider a contract
{
q(θ˜), pi(θ˜), r(θ˜, s˜)
}
. The
transfer that the firm obtains is given by (2.8).
After this change in variables I can write (2.5) as:
Ef(θ) {U(q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ))− pi(θ)} (2.9)
and (2.7) becomes:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ˜) + ∑
s∈S
r(θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
+ (2.10)
+C(θ˜, q(θ˜))− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
while (2.8) is simply:
pi(θ) ≥ 0 (2.11)
An optimal contract maximises (2.9) subject to (2.6) for all θ and all s
and (2.10) and (2.11) for all θ. Equation (2.9) shows that the contract design
problem is as if the government faces two costs: the cost of production and
the expected profit of the firm. Equation (2.10) requires that the expected
profit of the firm when it makes a truthful claim is greater or equal than when
it does not. The right hand side shows that the expected profit of the firm
when its type is θ and it claims that its type is θ˜ 6= θ is equal to its expected
profit when its type is θ˜ plus the difference in expected reimbursement with
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the reimbursement of type θ˜ plus the difference in the cost of production with
the quantity that the government demands for type θ˜.
The first best contract is not an optimal contract if an audit is not available:
for every type θ below the highest type the firm would claim that its type is
a θ˜ > θ to make a positive profit of C(θ˜, qFB(θ˜)) − C(θ, qFB(θ˜)) > 0 (the
right hand side of (2.10) with g(s | θ˜) − g(s | θ) = 0 for all s, pi(θ˜) = 0 and
q(θ˜) = qFB(θ˜)).
With auditing, the government has three complementary instruments to
prevent the firm when its type is a particular θ to claim that its type is a
particular θ˜ (equation (2.10)): 1) the profit scheme: the government can offer
a higher expected profit when the type of the firm is θ than when it is θ˜, 2) the
quantity scheme: the government can demand a quantity below the first best
quantity when the type of the firm is θ˜ and 3) the reimbursement scheme: the
government can require a positive reimbursement when the type of the firm
is θ˜ for outcomes of the audit that are more likely to occur when the type of
the firm is θ than when it is θ˜ (g(s | θ˜) − g(s | θ) < 0) and a negative one
otherwise. Employing the profit scheme or the quantity scheme is costly for
the government as it then does not achieve the same outcome as when it knows
the type of the firm (pi (θ) = 0 and q(θ) = qFB(θ) for all θ). Employing the
reimbursement scheme does not have a cost for the government and therefore
is preferable but it is limited by the constraint that in an optimal contract
bribery does not take place.
2.4.3 Simplifying results
A difficulty in the contract design problem is that for every outcome of the
audit ensuring that the reimbursement does not result in bribery involves the
comparison with the reimbursement for all the other outcomes of the audit
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(see (2.6)). Lemma 1 shows that this constraint is in fact a constraint on the
range of the reimbursement:
Lemma 1. An optimal contract satisfies that the range of the reimbursement
for the outcome of the audit (max
s∈S
r(θ, s) − min
s∈S
r(θ, s)) is smaller or equal
than the sum of the expected penalties (ψ = hPA + hPF ) for all the types of
the firm.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is simple: bribery does not take place if and
only if it does not take place when the incentive of the firm to bribe the internal
auditor is strongest. If the firm bribed the internal auditor then it would ask
the internal auditor to report the outcome of the audit for which it pays the
lowest reimbursement. Its incentive to bribe the internal auditor is strongest
for the outcome of the audit for which it pays the highest reimbursement.
Considering this case provides the bound on the range of the reimbursement
for which bribery does not take place, which I denote by ψ to simplify notation.
The bound is high when the external auditor is very likely to be informed and
the penalties that the firm and the internal auditor receive when the external
auditor detects misreporting are severe.
Lemma 1 clarifies how the threat of bribery constrains the reimbursement
scheme in an optimal contract. Lemma 2 makes this constraint more tractable:
Lemma 2. An optimal contract satisfies that:
min
s∈S
r(θ, s) = 0 (2.12)
r (θ, s) ∈ [0, ψ] ∀s (2.13)
for all the types of the firm.
28
The first part of Lemma 2 states that there is no point for the government
to require that the firm pays a reimbursement for all the outcomes of the audit:
for any type of the firm the government can alter all the reimbursements by an
amount that results in a zero minimum reimbursement and alter the transfer
by the same amount so that the expected profit of the firm is unchanged. This
change does not affect the incentives of the firm to bribe the auditor or to
make a truthful claim. Also it does not affect the payoff of the government.
Therefore there is an optimal contract for which the minimum reimbursement
that the firm pays is zero for all the types of the firm.
The second part of Lemma 2 follows directly from the first part together
with Lemma 1: by definition, every reimbursement is not lower than the
minimum reimbursement or higher than the maximum reimbursement and if
the minimum reimbursement is zero then Lemma 1 implies that the maximum
reimbursement for which bribery does not take place is smaller or equal than
the sum of the expected penalties for all the types of the firm.
From now on I focus on characterising an optimal contract that maximises
(2.9) subject to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) for all θ. It follows from
the previous discussion that any other contract in which for any type of the
firm the government demands the same quantity and the firm makes the same
expected profit is also optimal.
2.5 An optimal contract with two cost types
In this section I assume that the type of the firm is either low or high: Θ =
{θ, θ} with θ < θ. This simplifies the contract design problem as the firm can
only make a truthful claim or claim the other type (for every θ there is only
one θ˜ 6= θ).
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The payoff of the government in this case is given by:
(
U(q(θ))−C(θ, q(θ))−pi(θ)
)
f(θ)+
(
U(q(θ))−C(θ, q(θ))−pi(θ)
)
f(θ) (2.14)
The firm makes a truthful claim when its type is low if:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ) + ∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)
(
g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
)
+ C(θ, q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ)) (2.15)
and it makes a truthful claim when its type is high if:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ) + ∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)
(
g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
)
+ C(θ, q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ)) (2.16)
An optimal contract maximises (2.14) subject to (2.12), (2.13) and (2.11)
for θ and θ and (2.15) and (2.16). To obtain it, I take the approach of
conjecturing that in an optimal contract the constraint that the firm makes
a truthful claim when its type is high (equation (2.16)) is not relevant and I
then verify this guess. Lemma 3 presents the results that follow directly from
proceeding in this way:
Lemma 3. In an optimal contract the firm makes a zero expected profit when
its type is high (piSB(θ) = 0) and the government demands the first best quantity
when its type is low (q(θ) = qFB(θ)).
Lemma 3 provides a partial characterisation of an optimal contract. To
present the remaining characterisation in a format that is comparable to that
of the following sections, I divide the constraint that the firm makes a truthful
claim when its type is low (equation (2.15)) by the distance between types.
I denote the resulting second term in the right hand side by φ(q(θ)). The
constraint is then:
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pi(θ)− 0
θ − θ ≥
∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ + φ(q(θ)) (2.17)
I refer to the terms in this constraint as “adjusted”. The term in the left
hand side is then the adjusted difference in expected profit between the low
type and the high type. The second term in the right hand side is the adjusted
difference in the cost of production between the high type and the low type
with the quantity of the high type. It follows from the assumptions on C(θ, q)
that φ(0) = 0 and that φ(q) > 0, dφ(q)
dq
> 0 and d2φ(q)
dq2 ≥ 0 for q > 0.
As a benchmark for later use, I now consider the situation in which an
audit is not available. I refer to the corresponding optimal contract as second
best. Using the notation introduced above, Lemma 4 presents it:
Lemma 4. If an audit is not available then in an optimal contract the firm
makes a positive expected profit when its type is low (piSB(θ) > 0) and the
government demands a quantity below the first best quantity when its type is
high (qSB(θ) < qFB(θ)). These are given by:
piSB(θ) = (θ − θ)φ(qSB(θ)) (2.18)
f(θ)
(
dU(qSB(θ)))
dq
− dC(θ, q
SB(θ)))
dq
)
= f(θ)(θ − θ)dφ(q
SB(θ))
dq
(2.19)
Lemma 4 registers the result that when an audit is not available the
government employs both the expected profit scheme and the quantity scheme
to prevent the firm when its type is low from claiming that it is high
(piSB(θ) > 0 and qSB(θ) < qFB(θ)). The second best expected profit follows
from the fact that in an optimal contract the constraint that the firm makes a
truthful claim when its type is low binds if an audit is not available. In turn,
that determines the second best quantity when the type of the firm is high.
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This quantity optimally trades off the loss of surplus when the type of the
firm is high and the loss of expected profit when the type of the firm is low
that is due to the contract for the high type. The optimum is determined
considering the marginal quantity.
Returning to the situation in which an audit is available, I now focus on the
first term in the right hand side of (2.17). This term is the adjusted difference
in expected reimbursement between the high type and the low type with the
reimbursement of the high type. To determine its role in an optimal contract
I introduce a definition based on the negative of it:
Definition 1. The value of the audit is the maximum negative adjusted
difference in expected reimbursement between the high type and the low type
with the reimbursement of the high type for which bribery does not take place:
V = max
r(θ,s)∈[0, ψ]
−∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ = (2.20)
= − ∑
s∈S:g(s|θ)−g(s|θ)<0
ψ
g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ
The value of the audit captures the best use that the government can make
of the audit to prevent the firm when its type is low from claiming that it is
high. For those outcomes of the audit that are more likely to occur when
the type of the firm is low than when the type of the firm is high (g(s | θ)
−g(s | θ) < 0) it requests the highest reimbursement for which bribery does not
take place (r(θ, s) = ψ). For the other outcomes it requests no reimbursement.
Using the value of the audit I can determine the pairs of expected profit
scheme and quantity scheme for which there is a reimbursement scheme such
that the firm makes a truthful claim and bribery does not take place (those
that satisfy (2.17) with the first term in the right hand side equal to −V ).
I can then characterise an optimal contract:
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Proposition 1. An optimal contract is given by:
r(θ, s) =

ψmin
{
φ(qFB(θ))
V
, 1
}
if g(s | θ)− g(s | θ) < 0
0 if g(s | θ)− g(s | θ) ≥ 0
(2.21)
pi(θ) = (θ − θ) max
{
φ(qSB(θ))− V, 0
}
(2.22)
q(θ) =

qSB(θ) if V ≤ φ(qSB(θ))
qV (θ) if V ∈ [φ(qSB(θ)), φ(qFB(θ))]
qFB(θ) if V ≥ φ(qFB(θ))
(2.23)
with qV (θ) given by 0 = −V + φ(qV (θ)).
The government requires a reimbursement when the type of the firm is high
if and only if the outcome of the audit is more likely to occur when the type
of the firm is low than when it is high. The reimbursement is uniquely defined
to be the highest reimbursement for which bribery does not take place except
when the value of the audit is so high that the government can achieve the first
best expected profit scheme and quantity scheme with a lower reimbursement
(V > φ(qFB(θ))). In that situation an optimal reimbursement is the minimum
reimbursement that achieves the above outcome.10
If the value of the audit is not high enough for the government to achieve
the same outcome as when it knows the type of the firm then there are two
possible situations. For a low value of the audit (V < φ(qSB(θ))) when the
type of the firm is high the government demands the second best quantity and
when the type of the firm is low it offers an expected profit that is positive
10Any higher reimbursement up to the sum of expected penalties is also optimal. The
reason to select the reimbursement in Proposition 1 is again to facilitate the comparison
with the results of the following section.
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but lower than the second best. For an intermediate value of the audit (V ∈
[φ(qSB(θ)), φ(qFB(θ))]) when the type of the firm is high it demands a quantity
given by the value of the audit and φ(q) and when the type of the firm is low
it offers a zero expected profit. As dφ(q)
dq
> 0 it follows that this quantity is in
between the second best quantity and the first best quantity.
The two previous situations can be summarised by saying that an optimal
contract exhibits a separation property: when the type of the firm is high
the government demands the second best quantity unless the audit allows it
to offer the first best expected profit when the type of the firm is low. The
intuition for this property is the following: if the value of the audit is not
high enough for the government to achieve the first best outcome then the
constraint that the firm makes a truthful claim when its type is low binds
and the contract design problem is as if an audit is not available but with the
expected profit of the firm when its type is low decreased by the value of the
audit. As the trade off involving the quantity that the government demands
when the type of the firm is high does not change, the optimal quantity is the
same unless it results in a negative expected profit for the firm when its type
is low.
2.6 An optimal contract with a continuum of
cost types
2.6.1 The relaxed problem
In this section I assume that the type of the firm belongs to an interval:
Θ = [θ, θ] with θ < θ. I denote the cumulative distribution function of
θ by F (θ) and I assume that the hazard rate F (θ)
f(θ) is non decreasing and
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differentiable.11 I also assume that C(θ, q) and g(s | θ) are twice continuously
differentiable in θ.
To characterise an optimal contract, I assume that it is differentiable for
almost all the types of the firm and I replace the constraint that the firm makes
a truthful claim about its type (equation (2.10)) with a necessary differential
constraint.12 I then obtain an optimal contract in the resulting relaxed problem
and verify that it satisfies the original constraint (and is therefore an optimal
contract).
The payoff of the government in this case is given by:
ˆ θ
θ
(
U(q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ))− pi(θ)
)
f (θ) dθ (2.24)
To obtain the differential constraint I use the constraint that when its type
is θL < θ the firm does not claim that it is θ and the constraint that when it
is θ the firm does not claim that it is θH > θ. I divide the first constraint by
θ − θL and the second by θH − θ. Taking the limit as θL and θH go to θ and
denoting by φ(θ, q(θ)) the second term in the right hand side results in:
−dpi (θ)
dθ
=
∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) dg (s | θ)
dθ
+ φ(θ, q(θ)) (2.25)
Equation (2.25) is a necessary condition to prevent the firm from marginally
exaggerating its type. It is the equivalent of equation (2.17) for the case of a
continuum of cost types. The term in the left hand side is the negative of the
difference in expected profit between type θ and a marginally lower type. The
first term in the right hand side is the difference in expected reimbursement
11The monotone hazard rate property is a standard condition in the literature on
contracting with asymmetric information that many distributions (including normal,
uniform, logistic, chi-squared and exponential) satisfy (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)).
12Technically I assume that t (θ), q (θ) and r (θ, s) are differentiable for almost all θ. As
S is finite this means that pi (θ) is also differentiable for almost all θ.
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between type θ and a marginally lower type with the reimbursement of type
θ. The second term in the right hand side is the difference in the cost of
production between type θ and a marginally lower type with the quantity of
type θ. It follows from the assumptions on C(θ, q) that φ(θ, 0) = 0 and that
φ(θ, q) > 0, dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 and d2φ(θ,q)
dq2 ≥ 0 for q > 0.
An optimal contract in the relaxed problem maximises (2.24) subject to
(2.12), (2.13), (2.11) and (2.25) for all θ.13 As before, I first consider the
situation in which an audit is not available and I refer to the corresponding
optimal contract as second best. Lemma 5 presents it:
Lemma 5. If an audit is not available then in an optimal contract the
firm makes a positive expected profit when its type is below the highest type
(piSB(θ) > 0 for θ < θ) and the government demands a quantity below the
first best quantity when its type is above the lowest type (qSB(θ) < qFB(θ) for
θ > θ). These are given by:
pi (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
φ(η, qSB(η))dη (2.26)
f(θ)
(
dU(qSB(θ)))
dq
− dC(θ, q
SB(θ)))
dq
)
= F (θ)dφ(θ, q
SB(θ))
dq
(2.27)
Lemma 5 is the counterpart of Lemma 4. It states that when an audit
is not available the government employs both the expected profit scheme and
the quantity scheme to prevent the firm from marginally exaggerating its type.
The second best expected profit for type θ follows from integrating for all types
greater than θ the difference in expected profit with a marginally lower type
when an audit is not available (together with pi(θ) = 0). As for the second
best quantity for type θ, it optimally trades off the loss of surplus when the
13I have omitted the qualifier “almost” that should accompany equation (2.25), sacrificing
precision for the sake of brevity. In what follows I proceed in this way.
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type of the firm is θ and the loss of expected profit when the type of the firm
is below θ that is due to the contract for type θ.
Returning to the situation in which an audit is available, I now adapt
Definition 1 to the case of a continuum of cost types:
Definition 2. The value of the audit for type θ is the maximum negative
difference in expected reimbursement between type θ and a marginally lower
type with the reimbursement of type θ for which bribery does not take place:
V (θ) = max
r(θ,s)∈[0, ψ]
−∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) dg (s | θ)
dθ
= − ∑
s∈S: dg(s|θ)
dθ
<0
ψ
dg (s | θ)
dθ
(2.28)
Using the value of the audit for type θ, I can determine the pairs of expected
profit scheme and quantity scheme for which there is a reimbursement scheme
such that the firm does not have an incentive to marginally exaggerate its type
and bribery does not take place (those that satisfy (2.25) for all θ with the first
term in the right hand side equal to −V (θ)). I can then obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. An optimal contract in the relaxed problem is given by:
r (θ, s) =

ψmin
{
φ(θ,qFB(θ))
V (θ) , 1
}
if dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0
0 if dg(s|θ)
dθ
≥ 0
(2.29)
pi (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
max
{
φ(η, qSB(η))− V (η) , 0
}
dη (2.30)
q (θ) =

qSB (θ) if V (θ) ≤ φ(θ, qSB(θ))
qV (θ) if V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))]
qFB (θ) if V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB(θ))
(2.31)
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with qV (θ) given by 0 = −V (θ) + φ(θ, qV (θ)) if for any θ such that V (θ) ∈
[φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))] then:
d
dθ
 dU(qV (θ)))dq − dC(θ,qV (θ)))dq
dφ(θ,qV (θ))
dq
 ≤ 0 (2.32)
Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition under which an optimal
contract in the relaxed problem has the same structure as the contract in
Proposition 1. For any type θ with a relatively low value of the audit
(V (θ) < φ(qSB(θ))) the government demands the second best quantity and
it offers an expected profit that is marginally decreasing in type but less so
than the second best. For any type θ with a relatively intermediate value of
the audit (V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))]) it demands a quantity given
by the value of the audit and φ(θ, q) and it offers an expected profit that is
marginally constant in type. As dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 it follows that this quantity is in
between the second best quantity and the first best quantity.14
To understand the role of the condition in Proposition 2 consider first a
type θ with a relatively intermediate value of the audit and suppose that it is
optimal for the government to demand qV (θ).15 By the definition of qV (θ), the
government prevents the firm from marginally exaggerating its type without
generating a loss of expected profit. However there is a loss of surplus as
qV (θ) ≤ qFB(θ). Now consider a marginally higher type. This results in a
change in qV (θ). Equation (2.32) ensures that the comparative importance
of the loss of surplus at qV (θ) is non increasing. As the hazard rate is non
decreasing this implies that it is also optimal to eliminate the loss of expected
profit.
14The qualifier relatively is due to the fact that φ(θ, qSB(θ)) and φ(θ, qFB(θ)) depend on
the type of the firm.
15If there exists a type θ for which V (θ) = φ(θ, qSB(θ)) it is optimal for the government
to demand qV (θ) = qSB(θ).
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It is possible to write (2.32) in terms of the value of the audit for type θ
(rather than in terms of qV (θ)). I did not do so to facilitate its interpretation.
I now look at the implication of (2.32) on the value of the audit for type θ in
an example:
Example 1. Suppose that the cost function is given by C(θ, q) = θq. This
results in φ(q) = q so qV (θ) = V (θ). Also dC(θ,q)
dq
= θ and dφ(θ,q)
dq
= 1. Equation
(2.32) becomes:
d
dθ
 dU(V (θ)))dq − θ
1
 = d2U(V (θ)))
dq2
dV (θ)
dθ
− 1 ≤ 0 (2.33)
The utility function is concave so equation (2.33) is satisfied if the value of
the audit for type θ does not decrease too fast.
The general lesson of Example 1 is that equation (2.32) implies a bound
on the rate of decrease of qV (θ), which in turn implies a bound on the rate of
decrease of the value of the audit for type θ. As an optimal contract in the
relaxed problem depends on the value of the audit for type θ, this raises the
question of how an optimal contract in the relaxed problem varies across Θ.
Lemma 6 provides the result that answers this question:
Lemma 6. The condition in Proposition 2 implies that if V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qSB(θ))
for any type of the firm then this also holds for any higher type and the same
is true for V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB(θ)).
Lemma 6 states that the condition in Proposition 2 implies that in relative
terms the value of the audit is non decreasing: if it switches it goes from low
to intermediate or from intermediate to high. This result follows from the
fact equation (2.32) implies that qV (θ) does not decrease faster than qSB(θ)
whenever they are equal and the same is true for qFB(θ) (see equations (2.4)
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and (2.27)). This in turn implies that V (θ) does not decrease faster than
φ(θ, qSB(θ)) whenever they are equal and the same is true for φ(θ, qFB(θ)).
Using Lemma 6 I can be more specific about an optimal contract in
the relaxed problem. My first additional result concerns the expected profit
scheme:
Corollary 1. The expected profit scheme in Proposition 2 is positive and
decreasing if the type of the firm is below a threshold θSB and zero otherwise.
It is given by:
pi (θ) =

´ θSB
θ
φ(η, qSB (η))− V (η) dη if θ ∈ [θ, θSB]
0 if θ ∈ [θSB, θ]
(2.34)
where θSB = min θ ∈ Θ : V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qSB (θ)) if V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qSB (θ)) for
some θ and θSB = θ otherwise.
Corollary 1 conveys two pieces of additional information on the expected
profit scheme. First, it clarifies for which types the firm makes a positive
expected profit: only those below the type for which the value of the audit
switches from low to intermediate (θ ∈ [θ, θSB)). Second, it rules out the
possibility that the firm makes an expected profit that is positive and constant
for some types. In other words, if the expected profit of the firm is positive
then it is decreasing in the type of the firm.
My second additional result focuses on the quantity scheme:
Corollary 2. The quantity scheme in Proposition 2 consists of at most three
intervals. It is given by:
q (θ) =

qSB (θ) if θ ∈ [θ, θSB] and θSB > θ
qV (θ) if θ ∈ [θSB, θFB], θSB > θ and θSB < θ
qFB (θ) if θ ∈ [θFB, θ] and θFB < θ
(2.35)
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where θFB = min θ ∈ Θ : V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB (θ)) if V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB (θ)) for
some θ and θFB = θ otherwise and θSB is as in Corollary 1 (so θSB < θFB if
θSB ∈ (θ, θ) and θSB = θFB if θSB ∈ {θ, θ}).
Figure 2.1 presents a situation in which the three intervals in Corollary
2 exist (θSB > θ and θFB < θ) together with the resulting quantity scheme.
The perhaps surprising feature is that the government demands the first best
quantity when the type of the firm is at or above the type for which the value
of the audit switches from intermediate to high θ ∈ [θFB, θ]. This is in contrast
with the situation in which an audit is not available, where the government
demands a second best quantity that is closest to the first best quantity when
the type of the firm is close to the lowest type.
Figure 2.1: The case of three contract intervals (left) and the resulting quantity
scheme (right) with a continuum of cost types.
Closest inspection of Corollary 2 reveals that there are three other possible
situations: 1) the government demands the second best quantity for all the
types of the firm (θSB = θFB = θ), 2) the government demands the first best
quantity for all types of the firm (θSB = θFB = θ), 3) the government demands
the second best quantity when the type of the firm is in the interval [θ, θSB]
and it demands qV (θ) when the type of the firm is in the interval [θSB, θ].
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2.6.2 An optimal contract
I now consider under what conditions on the distribution of the outcome of
the audit and on the cost of production the contract in Proposition 2 satisfies
the constraint that the firm makes a truthful claim about its type (equation
(2.10)) and is therefore an optimal contract. Using the reimbursement scheme
(equation (2.29)) shows that when its type is θ the firm makes a truthful claim
if:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ˜) + ∑
s∈S: dg(s|θ˜)
dθ
<0
min
{
φ(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))
V (θ˜)
, 1
}
ψ(g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ))+ (2.36)
+C(θ˜, q(θ˜))− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
For any type θ this constraint involves all the other types and their
respective distribution of the outcome of the audit. I first find a condition
on the latter that ensures that it plays no role in the constraint beyond the
determination of the value of the audit for the corresponding type. Afterwards
I obtain conditions on the value of the audit and on the cost of production that
guarantee that the contract in Proposition 2 satisfies the resulting constraint.
I start by writing the second and the third term in the right hand side of
equation (2.36) in differential form:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ˜)−min
{
φ(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))
V (θ˜)
, 1
}ˆ θ˜
θ
− ∑
s∈S: dg(s|θ˜)
dθ
<0
ψ
dg(s | η)
dη
dη+ (2.37)
+
ˆ θ˜
θ
φ(η, q(θ˜))dη ∀θ˜ 6= θ
The term inside the first integral of equation (2.37) differs from the value
of the audit for type η (any type between θ and θ˜) only in that it considers
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those outcomes of the audit that are more likely to occur when the type of the
firm is marginally lower than θ˜ than when it is θ˜ (dg(s|θ˜)
dθ
< 0) instead of the
corresponding outcomes for type η. Nevertheless those outcomes are the same
if the audit satisfies the following property:
Definition 3. The audit has the monotonicity property if the probability of
every outcome of the audit is either decreasing for all the types of the firm
(dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0 for all θ) or non decreasing (dg(s|θ)
dθ
≥ 0 for all θ).
If the audit has the monotonicity property then the outcomes of the audit
for which the government requires a reimbursement are the same for all the
types of the firm and equation (2.37) becomes:
pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ˜)−min
{
φ(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))
V (θ˜)
, 1
}ˆ θ˜
θ
V (η)dη+ (2.38)
+
ˆ θ˜
θ
φ(η, q(θ˜))dη ∀θ˜ 6= θ
My main result for an audit that has the monotonicity property is this:
Proposition 3. If the audit has the monotonicity property, the value of the
audit is non increasing and both the cost of production and the marginal cost
of production are convex in θ then the contract in Proposition 2 is an optimal
contract.
Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions under which the contract in
Proposition 2 is an optimal contract. The assumption that the marginal cost of
production is convex in θ ensures that the second best quantity is decreasing in
θ. When the value of the audit is low for all the types of the firm (θSB = θ) this
result together with the monotonicity property suffice to verify that equation
(2.38) is satisfied for all θ. The reason is that in this situation for any type θ
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if the firm claims that its type is any θ˜ 6= θ the difference in expected
reimbursement with the reimbursement of type θ˜ is equal to the difference
in expected profit that is attributable to the value of the audit. As a result
the incentive of the firm to make a truthful claim about its type does not
depend on the value of the audit.
The assumption that the cost of production is convex in θ means that
φ(θ, q) is increasing in θ. Together with the assumption that the value of the
audit is non increasing this assumption has two important implications. First,
it ensures that the firm prefers to make a truthful claim that results in a zero
expected profit (θ ∈ [θSB, θ]) than to claim that its type is a θ˜ for which the
expected profit is positive (θ˜ < θSB). Second, it guarantees that the firm
makes a non positive expected profit when it claims that its type is a θ˜ for
which the expected profit is zero (θ˜ ≥ θSB) for all θ. These two observations
together with the previous one prove that equation (2.38) is satisfied for all θ.
I conclude this section with a simple example that satisfies the conditions
in both Propositions 2 and 3 and has a clear economic interpretation:
Example 2. The cost of production is C(θ, q) = θq (as in Example 1). The
set of outcomes of the audit is S = {s1, ..., sF , sF+1, ...sn}. The distribution of
the outcome of the audit satisfies that dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0 and d2g(s|θ)
dθ2 = 0 for all θ and
all s ∈ {s1, ..., sF} and that dg(s|θ)dθ ≥ 0 for all θ and all s ∈ {sF+1, ..., sn}.
Both the cost of production and the marginal cost of production are
convex in θ. Any outcome of the audit between s1 and sF has the natural
interpretation of the firm failing the audit as it results in the firm paying a
reimbursement (dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0). Analogously, any outcome of the audit above sF
has the interpretation of the firm passing the audit. The first condition on the
distribution of the outcome of the audit requires that the probability of any fail
is decreasing in the type of the firm at a constant rate. The second condition
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on the distribution of the audit requires that the probability of any pass is non
decreasing in the type of the firm. The value of the audit for type θ is given
by V (θ) = ∑−
s≤sF
ψ dg(s|θ)
dθ
. It is constant for all θ (dV (θ)
dθ
= ∑
s<s+
−ψ d2g(s|θ)
dθ2 = 0) so
the conditions in both Propositions 2 (as given in (2.33)) and 3 are satisfied.
2.7 Conclusions and extensions
In this chapter I began by arguing that in an optimal procurement contract the
threat of bribery constrains the reimbursement that the government requests
from the firm to be smaller or equal than the sum of the expected penalties
that the firm and the internal auditor pay. For the case of two cost types I
then constructed a measure (the value of the audit) that captures the best use
that the government can make of the audit to prevent the firm from making a
false claim about its type. I employed this measure to characterise an optimal
contract and I showed that it exhibits a separation property: the government
gives priority to achieving the first best expected profit scheme over demanding
the first best quantity scheme. I explained the intuition behind this result
and I provided sufficient conditions under which it extends to the case of a
continuum of cost types.
Baron and Besanko (1984) presented the most general characterisation of
an optimal contract with auditing in the context of regulation. They assumed
that the regulator is restricted to request a reimbursement from the firm not
greater than a legally specified amount. My analysis differed from theirs
in three aspects. First, the highest possible optimal reimbursement in my
model was a function of how well informed the external auditor is. Second,
to characterise an optimal contract in the relaxed problem I did not assume
a specific distribution of the outcome of the audit whereas they assumed a
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normal distribution with a mean non decreasing and convex in the type of the
firm. Third, I was able to provide sufficient conditions under which preventing
the firm from marginally exaggerating its type implies preventing the firm from
making a false claim about its type whereas they only provided an example
where this is true for some parameter configurations.
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) introduced the distinction between a
corruptible internal auditor and an honest external auditor that I employ in
this thesis. They analysed a contract design problem that features a principal,
an agent with a privately known productivity (its type), an internal auditor
and a costly external auditor. They obtained a separation property assuming
that both the type of the agent and the outcome of the audit take two possible
values. I provided sufficient conditions under which an optimal contract has a
separation property for the case of a continuum of cost types. I then showed
that it implies that the government demands the first best quantity when the
type of the firm is either the lowest type or a type at or above the type for
which the value of the audit switches from intermediate to high.16
Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (2006) studied a model of procurement with
auditing in which the type of the firm takes a continuum of possible values.
They assumed that the government is restricted to request a reimbursement
such that the expected profit of the firm is not lower than its liability. They
then established sufficient conditions under which the government can achieve
the outcome of the first best contract. Unlike Baron and Besanko, they did
not restrict attention to a particular distribution of the outcome of the audit.
However, they incorrectly argued that limited liability makes it optimal for the
16Kofman and Lawarree assumed that the principal pays the internal auditor a reward
if the agent claims that its type is low and the internal auditor reports the outcome of
the audit that is more likely to occur when the type of the agent is high. In chapter 3 I
allow the government to offer the internal auditor a contract that is a function of the same
contingencies as the contract that the government offers to the firm.This generalises their
analysis in terms of contracting and side contracting.
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government to request the highest possible reimbursement for all the outcomes
of the audit except for the outcome that is most likely to occur for the type that
the firm claimed to have.17 As a result, their characterisation of an optimal
contract with a continuum of types substantially differs from mine.
My analysis is robust to several extensions: First, I can let the internal
auditor be the one that proposes the side contract. In that situation my results
do not change as in an optimal side contract the internal auditor chooses its
report to minimise the reimbursement that the firm pays plus the sum of the
expected penalties. Second, I can consider the payoff of the government to be a
weighted sum of its utility and the profit of the firm (as in Baron and Myerson
(1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986)). In that circumstance the closer the
weight on the profit of the firm is to the weight on the utility of the government
the closer the second best quantity scheme is to the first best quantity scheme.
Third, I can assume that the internal auditor is risk averse. In that scenario
the expected disutility of the penalty that the internal auditor pays replaces
the expected penalty that the internal auditor pays in the characterisation of
both an optimal side contract and an optimal contract.18, 19
More interesting is the question of how my results vary if I allow the
government to offer the internal auditor a contract that is a function of the
same contingencies as the contract that the government offers to the firm.
I devote chapter 3 to answering this question. In the answer I also prove and
17More precisely, they ignored that with limited liability there is a trade off between
requiring a reimbursement for as many outcomes as possible to request an amount below
the limited liability of the firm and requiring a reimbursement for those outcomes of the
audit that are more likely to occur for a marginally higher type to prevent the firm from
marginally exaggerating its type.
18If the firm can offer a side contract that is contingent on the report of the external
auditor then in an optimal side contract the firm pays a bribe equal to the penalty that the
internal auditor pays if the external auditor detects misreporting and a zero bribe otherwise.
The risk aversion of the internal auditor has then no effect on my results.
19If the firm is risk averse then the government cannot achieve the outcome of the first
best contract for any value of the audit as an audit involves risk. Lemma 2 is not valid when
the firm is risk averse.
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explain a result that I employed in this chapter: that, with the information
structure of the external auditor and the penalties that I had assumed, there
is an optimal truthful contract for which bribery does not take place for any
type of the firm and any outcome of the audit.
Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1) For any θ equation (2.6) is satisfied for all s if and only if:
max
s∈S
r (θ, s) ≤ min
s∈S
r (θ, s) + hPA + hPF (2.39)
Rearranging (2.39) gives the condition on the range of the reimbursement
in the lemma. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Lemma 2) Suppose that there is an optimal contract{
q0(θ˜), pi0(θ˜), r0(θ˜, s˜)
}
that satisfies (2.10), (2.11) and (2.39) for all θ
and min
s∈S
r0(θ, s) 6= 0 for some θ. I can construct the alternative contract{
qA(θ˜), piA(θ˜), rA(θ˜, s˜)
}
as follows: qA(θ˜) = q0(θ˜) and piA(θ˜) = pi0(θ˜) for all θ˜
and rA(θ˜, s˜) = r0(θ˜, s˜)−min
s˜∈S
r0(θ˜, s˜) for all θ˜ and all s˜.
Applying the minimum function to rA(θ, s) gives min
s∈S
rA(θ, s) =
min
s∈S
r0(θ, s)−min
s∈S
r0(θ, s) = 0 for all θ. Equation (2.39) for all θ then gives
max
s∈S
rA(θ, s) ≤ ψ= hPA + hPF for all θ. Therefore rA(θ, s) ∈ [0, ψ] for all θ
and all s.
Also, as ∑
s∈S
rA(θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
= ∑
s∈S
r0(θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
for all θ˜, replacing qA(θ˜) and piA(θ˜) in (2.10) gives (2.10) for the initial contract
for all θ. Therefore the alternative contract satisfies (2.10) for all θ.
By construction, the alternative contract satisfies (2.11) for all θ.
Furthermore, replacing qA(θ˜) and piA(θ˜) in (2.9) gives (2.9) for the initial
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contract. Therefore the alternative contract is also optimal. This completes
the proof.
Proof. (Proposition 1) An optimal contract maximises (2.14) subject to (2.12),
(2.13) and (2.11) for θ and θ and (2.15) and (2.16). If (2.16) is not a constraint
then any r(θ, s) that satisfies (2.12) and (2.13) for θ is optimal. Also, in an
optimal contract pi(θ) = 0 and q(θ) = qFB(θ). Equation (2.15) then becomes
(2.17). The Lagrangian for this problem when (2.12) and (2.13) are satisfied
for θ is:
L = (−pi(θ))f(θ) + (U(q(θ)− C(θ, q(θ)))f(θ)+ (2.40)
+γ
(
pi(θ)
θ − θ −
∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ − φ(q(θ))
)
+ λpi(θ)
where γ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers of (2.17) and (2.11).
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal
contract when (2.12) is satisfied for θ are:
(
dU(q(θ))
dq
− dC(θ, q(θ))
dq
)
f(θ) = γ dφ(q(θ))
dq
(2.41)
r(θ, s) =

ψ if γ(g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)) < 0
[0, ψ] if γ(g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)) = 0
0 if γ(g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)) > 0
(2.42)
−f(θ) + γ
θ − θ + λ ≤ 0, pi(θ) ≥ 0, (−f(θ) +
γ
θ − θ + λ)pi(θ) = 0 (2.43)
γ ≥ 0, pi(θ)
θ − θ −
∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ − φ(q(θ)) ≥ 0, (2.44)
γ
(
pi(θ)
θ − θ −
∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s | θ)− g(s | θ)
θ − θ − φ(q(θ))
)
= 0
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λ ≥ 0, pi(θ) ≥ 0, λpi(θ) = 0 (2.45)
Suppose that γ > 0. Equation (2.42) gives −∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s|θ)−g(s|θ)
θ−θ = V .
Equation (2.44) then gives pi(θ)
θ−θ +V −φ(q(θ)) = 0. Equations (2.43) and (2.45)
give γ ≤ f(θ)(θ − θ). There are two possible situations. First, suppose that
γ = f(θ)(θ− θ) so λ = 0. Equation (2.41) then gives q(θ) = qSB(θ). Equation
(2.44) then gives pi(θ) = (θ − θ)(φ(qSB(θ)) − V ). As equations (2.43) and
(2.45) require pi(θ) ≥ 0 this then requires V ≤ φ(qSB(θ)). Second, suppose
that γ ∈ (0, f(θ)(θ − θ)). If λ = 0 then equation (2.43) gives pi(θ) = 0.
If λ > 0 then equation (2.45) gives pi(θ) = 0. Equation (2.44) then gives
0 = −V + (φ(qV (θ)). The left hand side of equation (2.41) is decreasing
in q(θ) whereas the right hand side is non decreasing. This together with
γ ∈ (0, f(θ)(θ − θ)) then require qV (θ) ∈ (qSB(θ), qFB(θ)). As dφ(q)
dq
> 0 this
then requires V ∈ (φ(qSB(θ)), φ(qFB(θ)).
Suppose that γ = 0. Equation (2.41) gives q(θ) = qFB(θ). If λ = 0 then
(2.43) gives pi(θ) = 0. If λ > 0 then (2.45) gives pi(θ) = 0. Replacing in (2.44)
gives −∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s|θ)−g(s|θ)
θ−θ − φ(qFB(θ)) ≥ 0. As −
∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s|θ)−g(s|θ)
θ−θ ≤ V
this then requires V ≥ φ(qFB(θ)). From (2.42) any r(θ, s) that satisfies
V ≥ φ(qFB(θ)) is optimal. The reimbursement scheme in (2.21) gives
−∑
s∈S
r (θ, s) g(s|θ)−g(s|θ)
θ−θ = φ(q
FB(θ)) so it is optimal.
From the fact that g(s | θ) is a probability function there exists at least
one outcome s such that g(s | θ) − g(s | θ) ≥ 0. Therefore (2.12) is satisfied
for θ. To verify that (2.16) is satisfied I consider r(θ, s) = 0 for all s. Equation
(2.16) then requires 0 ≥ pi(θ) − (θ − θ)φ(qFB(θ)). This is satisfied if 0 ≥
(θ − θ)φ(qSB(θ)) − (θ − θ)φ(qFB(θ)). As qSB(θ) < qFB(θ) < qFB(θ) and
dφ(q)
dq
> 0 this is satisfied. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Proposition 2) An optimal contract in the relaxed problem maximises
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(2.24) subject to (2.12), (2.13), (2.11) and (2.25) for all θ. The Hamiltonian
for this problem when (2.12) and (2.13) are satisfied for all θ is:
H = (U(q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ))− pi(θ))f(θ)+ (2.46)
+µ (θ)
(
−∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)dg(s | θ)
dθ
− φ(θ, q(θ))
)
+ τ (θ) pi (θ)
where µ (θ) is the costate variable and τ (θ) is the Lagrange multiplier of (2.11).
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal contract when (2.12)
is satisfied for all θ are:20
f(θ)
(
dU(q(θ))
dq
− dC(θ, q(θ))
dq
)
= µ(θ)dφ(θ, q(θ))
dq
(2.47)
r(θ, s) =

ψ if µ(θ)dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0
[0, ψ] if µ(θ)dg(s|θ)
dθ
= 0
0 if µ(θ)dg(s|θ)
dθ
> 0
(2.48)
dpi(θ)
dθ
= −∑
s∈S
r(θ, s)dg(s | θ)
dθ
− φ(θ, q(θ)) (2.49)
dµ(θ)
dθ
= − dH
dpi(θ) = f(θ)− τ(θ) (2.50)
τ(θ)pi(θ) = 0, τ(θ) ≥ 0, pi(θ) ≥ 0 (2.51)
µ(θ) ≤ 0, µ(θ)pi(θ) = 0 (2.52)
µ(θ) ≥ 0, µ(θ)pi(θ) = 0 (2.53)
The costate variable determines the quantity scheme and the
reimbursement scheme (equations (2.47) and (2.48)), which together determine
20For a proof of the necessity and sufficiency of these conditions see Seierstad and
Sydsaeter (1987).
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the marginal decrease in the expected profit scheme (equation (2.49)). To
characterise the costate variable for which an optimal contract in the relaxed
problem has the separation property, I first define µV (θ) as the value of the
costate variable that results in q(θ) = qV (θ):
(
dU(qV (θ))
dq
− dC(θ, q
V (θ))
dq
)
f(θ) = µV (θ)dφ(θ, q
V (θ))
dq
(2.54)
The left hand side of (2.54) is decreasing in qV (θ) whereas the right
hand side is non decreasing. The comparison with (2.4) gives µV (θ) ≥ 0
if qV (θ) ≤ qFB(θ). The comparison with (2.27) gives µV (θ) ≤ F (θ) if
qV (θ) ≤ qFB(θ). As dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 this is equivalent to µV (θ) ∈ [0, F (θ)] if
V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))].
I now consider the following costate variable:
µ (θ) =

F (θ) if V (θ) ≤ φ(θ, qSB(θ))
µV (θ) if V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))]
0 if V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB(θ))
(2.55)
Replacing (2.55) in (2.47) results in the quantity scheme in (2.31). Also,
the reimbursement scheme in (2.29) satisfies (2.48) as (2.55) gives µ(θ) > 0
if V (θ) < φ(θ, qFB(θ)). Using (2.29) and (2.31) I can then write (2.49)
as dpi(θ)
dθ
=min
{
V (θ)− φ(θ, qSB(θ)), 0
}
= −max
{
φ(θ, qSB(θ))− V (θ), 0
}
.
Integrating the previous expression from θ to θ with pi(θ) = 0 results in the
expected profit scheme in (2.30).
I next check that (2.55) satisfies (2.50). Equation (2.51) gives τ(θ) ≥ 0
so (2.50) is satisfied if dµ(θ)
dθ
≤ f(θ). From (2.55) this requires dµV (θ)
dθ
≤ f(θ)
whenever V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))]. Applying the implicit function
theorem in (2.54) I can write this inequality as:
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dµV (θ)
dθ
= f(θ)
 d
dθ
 dU(qV (θ)))dq − dC(θ,qV (θ)))dq
dφ(θ,qV (θ))
dq
+ µV (θ)
f(θ)2
df(θ)
dθ
 ≤ f(θ) (2.56)
The assumption that the hazard rate is non decreasing gives d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
=
= 1 − F (θ)
f(θ)2
df(θ)
dθ
≥ 0. As µV (θ) ∈ [0, F (θ)] this gives 1 − µV (θ)
f(θ)2
df(θ)
dθ
≥ 0. As
a result dµV (θ)
dθ
≤ f(θ) is satisfied if the first term in the parenthesis is non
positive. This is the condition in Proposition 2.
I now verify that (2.55) and the expected profit scheme in (2.30) satisfy
(2.51). If V (θ) ≤ φ(θ, qSB(θ)) then (2.55) and (2.50) give τ(θ) = 0 so (2.51) is
satisfied. If V (θ) ∈ [φ(θ, qSB(θ)), φ(θ, qFB(θ))] and dµV (θ)
dθ
< f(θ) then (2.55)
and (2.50) give τ(θ) > 0. If V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB(θ)) then (2.55) and (2.50) give
τ(θ) = f(θ). In both situations (2.51) gives pi(θ) = 0. The expected profit
scheme in (2.30) satisfies pi(θ) = 0 for V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qSB(θ)) if whenever this
holds for any type θ it also holds for any higher type. The proof of Lemma 6
shows that (2.32) implies this.
Equation (2.55) and the expected profit scheme in (2.30) satisfy (2.52) and
(2.53) as µ(θ) = 0 and pi(θ). From the fact that g(s | θ) is a probability
function there exists at least one outcome s such that dg(s|θ)
dθ
≥ 0 for all θ.
Therefore (2.12) is satisfied for all θ. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Lemma 6) Suppose that V (θ) ≥ φ((θ, qSB(θ)) for some type θ and
this does not hold for some type higher than θ. There is then a type θ such
that V (θ) =φ(θ, qSB(θ)) and dV (θ)
dθ
< dφ(θ,q
SB(θ))
dθ
. As V (θ) = φ(θ, qV (θ)) and
dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 the first equation gives qV (θ) = qSB(θ). As dV (θ)
dθ
= dφ(θ,qV (θ))
dθ
and
dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 the second equation gives dqV (θ)
dθ
< dq
SB(θ)
dθ
.
I now show that (2.32) gives dqSB(θ)
dθ
≤ dqV (θ)
dθ
. Equation (2.27) and the
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assumption that d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≥ 0 gives:
d
dθ
 dU(qSB(θ)))dq − dC(θ,qSB(θ)))dq
dφ(θ,qSB(θ))
dq
 ≥ 0 (2.57)
Comparing (2.57) with (2.32) when qV (θ) = qSB(θ) gives:
d
dq
 dU(qSB(θ)))dq − dC(θ,qSB(θ)))dq
dφ(θ,qSB(θ))
dq
 dqSB(θ)
dθ
≥ (2.58)
d
dq
 dU(qSB(θ)))dq − dC(θ,qSB(θ)))dq
dφ(θ,qSB(θ))
dq
 dqV (θ)
dθ
The common derivative in (2.58) is negative as dU(qSB(θ)))
dq
− dC(θ,qSB(θ)))
dq
> 0,
dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 and d2φ(θ,q)
dq2 ≥ 0. Equation (2.58) then gives dq
SB(θ)
dθ
≤ dqV (θ)
dθ
.
The proof for V (θ) ≥ φ((θ, qFB(θ)) follows the same steps dividing (2.4)
by dφ(θ,qFB(θ))
dq
. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Proposition 3) If the audit has the monotonicity property then the
contract in Proposition 2 is an optimal contract if it satisfies (2.38) for all θ. I
show that if the value is non increasing and both the cost of production and the
marginal cost of production are convex in θ then the contract in Proposition 2
satisfies (2.38) for all θ. If the cost of production is convex in θ then dφ(θ,q)
dθ
≥ 0.
If the marginal cost of production is convex in θ then d2φ(θ,q)
dθdq
≥ 0. Equation
(2.27) and the assumption that d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≥ 0 then gives dqSB(θ)
dθ
< 0.
I consider the situation in which the three intervals in Corollary 2 exist.
The proof applies a fortiori if not all of them do:
Suppose that θ˜ ∈ [θ, θSB] and θSB > θ. There are two possible situations.
First, if θ ∈ [θ, θSB] then (2.38) reduces to 0 ≥
´ θ˜
θ
φ(η, qSB(θ˜))−φ(η, qSB(η))dη
for all θ ∈ [θ, θSB] and θ˜ 6= θ. As dφ(θ,q)dq > 0 and dq
SB(θ)
dθ
< 0 then
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φ(η, qSB(θ˜)) < φ(η, qSB(η)) if θ˜ > θ and φ(η, qSB(θ˜)) > φ(η, qSB(η)) if θ˜ < θ
so the integral is negative. Second, if θ ∈ [θSB, θ] then (2.38) reduces to
0 ≥ ´ θSB
θ˜
φ(η, qSB(η)) − φ(η, qSB(θ˜))dη + ´ θ
θSB
V (η)−φ(η, qSB(θ˜))dη for all
θ ∈ [θSB, θ] and θ˜ 6= θ. As dφ(θ,q)dq > 0 and dq
SB(θ)
dθ
< 0 the first integral is
non positive. As dV (θ)
dθ
≤ 0, dφ(θ,q)
dθ
≥ 0, dφ(θ,q)
dq
> 0 and dqSB(θ)
dθ
< 0 then
V (η) ≤ V (θSB) = φ(θSB, qSB(θSB)) ≤ φ(η, qSB(θSB)) < φ(η, qSB(η)) so the
second integral is non positive.
Suppose that θ˜ ∈ [θSB, θFB], θSB > θ and θSB < θ. Equation (2.38)
reduces to pi(θ) ≥ 0 + ´ θ˜
θ
φ(η, qV (θ˜)) − V (η)dη for all θ˜ 6= θ. As dV (θ)
dθ
≤ 0
and dφ(θ,q)
dθ
≥ 0 then V (η) ≥ V (θ˜) = φ(θ˜, qV (θ˜)) ≥ φ(η, qSB(θ˜)) if θ˜ > θ and
V (η) ≤ V (θ˜) = φ(θ˜, qV (θ˜)) ≤ φ(η, qSB(θ˜)) if θ˜ < θ so the integral is non
positive for all θ˜ 6= θ.
Suppose that θ˜ ∈ [θFB, θ] and θFB < θ. Equation (2.38) reduces to pi(θ) ≥
0+
´ θ˜
θ
φ(η, qFB(θ˜))− φ(θ˜,qFB(θ˜))
V (θ˜) V (η)dη for all θ˜ 6= θ. As
dV (θ)
dθ
≤ 0 and dφ(θ,q)
dθ
≥ 0
then V (η) ≥ V (θ˜) and φ(θ˜, qFB(θ˜)) ≤ φ(η, qFB(θ˜)) if θ˜ > θ and V (η) ≤ V (θ˜)
and φ(θ˜, qFB(θ˜)) ≥ φ(η, qFB(θ˜)) if θ˜ < θ so the integral is non positive for all
θ˜ 6= θ. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Procurement with a
Contingent Contract for the
Internal Auditor
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I characterise an optimal procurement contract for a
government that purchases a good or service from a firm that has private
information about its cost of production when the government has available the
reports of a corruptible internal auditor and an honest but less well informed
external auditor. In contrast with chapter 2, I do so allowing the government to
offer the internal auditor a contract that consists of a transfer, a reimbursement
and a penalty that are a function of the same contingencies as the transfer, the
reimbursement and the penalty that the government offers to the firm.1 This
contract leads to several possible side contracts, depending on the contracting
variables. I assume that the firm can offer the internal auditor a side contract
1This chapter makes substantial use of the terminology, notation, definitions and results
in chapter 2. I therefore strongly recommend reading that chapter before proceeding further.
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that includes the claims of the firm from the point in time at which the offer
takes place and the report of the internal auditor. I then consider two possible
situations. In the first situation side contracting takes place after the firm
makes a claim about its type but before it makes a claim about the outcome
of the audit. In the second situation side contracting takes place before the
firm makes a claim about its type. I refer to these two situations as ex post
and ex ante side contracting respectively.
I first characterise an optimal contract with ex post side contracting. In
that situation the government can ensure that the internal auditor reports
truthfully when it rejects an ex post side contract by requiring a reimbursement
from the internal auditor that is not contingent on its report. As a result, in
an optimal ex post side contract the firm pays the internal auditor a zero bribe
if it requests the internal auditor to report truthfully and a bribe equal to the
difference in reimbursement plus the expected penalty that the internal auditor
pays otherwise. The contract design problem is then as if the firm selects its
claim about the outcome of the audit and the report of the internal auditor
to minimise the sum of the reimbursements plus the sum of the expected
penalties.
In Proposition 4 I demonstrate that when side contracting takes place ex
post the government can achieve the outcome of the first best contract both
for the case of two cost types and for the case of a continuum of cost types in
the relaxed problem if the value of the audit is positive (for all the types of
the firm in the latter case). The government offers the firm a reimbursement
scheme that prevents the firm from making a false claim for the first best
quantity scheme and expected profit scheme. The government ensures that
bribery does not take place by giving the internal auditor the reimbursement
that the firm pays. This is not costly for the government as for every type
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of the firm the government pays the internal auditor a transfer equal to the
expected reimbursement that the internal auditor pays.
I next characterise an optimal contract with ex ante side contracting
assuming that the internal auditor observes the type of the firm. This
assumption ensures that in an optimal ex ante side contract the firm pays
the internal auditor an expected bribe such that the expected payoff of the
internal auditor is the same as if it rejects the side contract. The contract
design problem is then as if the firm selects its claims about its type and about
the outcome of the audit and the report of the internal auditor to maximise
the sum of their expected payoffs.
The claims and the report that the firm selects with ex ante side contracting
depend on the sum of the transfers and the sum of the reimbursements but not
on how they add up. Therefore with ex ante side contracting it is optimal for
the government to offer the internal auditor a non contingent contract. The
contract design problem is then as in chapter 2: the firm controls the report of
the internal auditor at a cost of misreporting equal to the sum of the expected
penalties. An optimal contract is then given by Proposition 1 for the case of
two cost types and by Propositions 2 and 3 for the case of a continuum of cost
types. I employ this section to address the question of why bribery does not
take place in an optimal contract.
In Proposition 5 I prove that if the sum of the expected penalties that
the firm and the internal auditor pay is independent of the extent of the
misreporting then the government can achieve the optimal quantity scheme
and expected profit scheme of a contract for which bribery takes place with
a contract for which bribery does not take place. As bribery is costly for the
government, it is then optimal for the government to deter it. This result is
valid regardless of the the distribution of the outcome of the audit and of the
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belief of the government about the type of the firm.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In the next section I describe
the model under consideration and in section 3.3 I present the benchmark case
in which the government observes the type of the firm. After this, in section
3.4 I state the contract design problem with ex post side contracting and
characterise an optimal contract and in section 3.5 I perform the same tasks
with ex ante side contracting. With the analysis completed, in section 3.6 I
conclude, discuss the relationship between my results and existing research
and comment on some possible extensions. Finally, in the appendix I prove
those results that do not follow directly from others.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Contracting parties and information structures
The contracting parties are the same as in subsection 2.2.1. The information
structures of the government, the firm and the external auditor are also the
same. I now assume that the internal auditor observes both the outcome of
the audit and the type of the firm.2 For the case of a continuum of cost types
I also assume that g(s | θ) is twice continuously differentiable in θ, as I did in
subsection 2.6.1.
3.2.2 Contracts
The contract that the government offers to the firm consists of a transfer tF (θ˜)
in exchange for a quantity q(θ˜) and a reimbursement rF (θ˜, s˜, sˆ). The contract
that the government offers to the internal auditor consists of a transfer tA(θ˜)
2This assumption is not relevant in section 3.4 but I use it to simplify the exposition of
my results.
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and a reimbursement rA(θ˜, s˜, sˆ). The firm selects the claims θ˜ and s˜ from two
message spaces Mθ and Ms after observing θ and s respectively.
The ex post side contract consists of a bribe b(s, s˜) and a report sˆ(s, s˜).
The meaning of this side contract is that, when the outcome of the audit is
s, the firm makes the claim s˜ and pays the internal auditor the bribe b(s, s˜)
if the internal auditor reports sˆ = sˆ(s, s˜). The side contract b(s, s) = 0 and
sˆ(s, s) = s corresponds to no ex post bribery.
The ex ante side contract consists of a bribe b(θ, θ˜, s, s˜) and a report
sˆ(θ, θ˜, s, s˜) for all s. The meaning of this side contract is that, when the type of
the firm is θ, the firm makes the claim θ˜ and after observing s makes the claim
s˜ and pays the internal auditor the bribe b(θ, θ˜, s, s˜) if the internal auditor
reports sˆ = sˆ(θ, θ˜, s, s˜). The side contract b(θ, θ, s, s) = 0 and sˆ(θ, θ, s, s) = s
for all s corresponds to no ex ante bribery.
If the external auditor detects misreporting then the firm and the internal
auditor pay respective penalties PF and PA. I assume that the penalties are
legally specified so the government has no choice over them.
3.2.3 Preferences
The payoff of the government when the firm produces a quantity q, the
government pays transfers tF and tA and it receives reimbursements rF and
rA is U(q)− tF − tA + rF + rA. I make the assumptions on U(q) that I made
in subsection 2.2.3.
The payoff (profit) of the firm when it produces a quantity q, it receives
a transfer tF and it pays a reimbursement rF , a bribe b and a penalty PF is
piF = tF − rF − b−PF − C(θ, q). I make the assumptions on C(θ, q) that I
made in subsection 2.2.3. For the case of a continuum of cost types I also
assume that C(θ, q) is twice continuously differentiable in θ, as I did in
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subsection 2.6.1.
The payoff (profit) of the internal auditor when it receives a transfer tA
and a bribe b and it pays a reimbursement rA and a penalty PA is piA =
tA + b− rA − PA. The payoff of the external auditor does not depend on the
relationship with the other contracting parties.
The contracting parties are risk neutral. The firm and the internal auditor
accept a contract if their expected payoff is greater or equal than their
reservation payoff, which I normalize to zero.
3.2.4 Timing
The timing of the contractual relationships is as follows:3
1. The firm and the internal auditor observe θ.
2. The government offers a contract to the firm and the internal auditor.
3. With ex ante side contracting the firm offers a side contract to the
internal auditor.
4. The firm makes a claim θ˜, produces a quantity q and receives a
transfer tF . The internal auditor receives a transfer tA.
5. The firm and the internal auditor observe s.
6. With ex post side contracting the firm offers a side contract to the
internal auditor.
7. The firm makes a claim s˜ and the internal auditor reports sˆ. The firm
pays a reimbursement rF and a bribe b. The internal auditor pays a
reimbursement rA.
3In this timing I do not mention what happens when the firm or the internal reject the
contract or the internal auditor rejects the side contract as these are not optimal choices.
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8. The external auditor observes σ and reports. If it reports evidence
of misreporting then the firm and the internal auditor pay respective
penalties PF and PA.
3.3 The benchmark case
As a benchmark case for later use, I first consider the situation in which the
government observes the type of the firm. In that situation, the contract that
the government offers to the firm consists of a transfer tF (θ) in exchange for a
quantity q(θ). The contract that the government offers to the internal auditor
consists of a transfer tA(θ). The payoff of the government is the utility of the
quantity that it demands minus the transfers that it pays. This is given by:
U(q(θ))− tF (θ)− tA(θ) (3.1)
The firm accepts the contract if:
piF (θ) = tF (θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 (3.2)
whereas the internal auditor accepts the contract if:
piA(θ) = tA(θ) ≥ 0 (3.3)
An optimal contract maximises (3.1) subject to (3.2) and (3.3) for all θ.
The optimal transfer that the government pays to the firm is equal to the cost
of production so the firm makes a zero first best expected profit:
piFBF (θ) = 0 (3.4)
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The optimal transfer that the government pays to the internal auditor is
equal to zero so the internal auditor makes a zero first best expected profit:
piFBA (θ) = 0 (3.5)
The government demands the first best quantity qFB (θ) defined in (2.4).
3.4 An optimal contract with ex post side
contracting
3.4.1 Statement of the problem
I state the contract design problem with ex post side contracting under
two restrictions on the contract that the government offers to the firm and
the internal auditor. The purpose of these restrictions is to facilitate the
characterisation of an optimal contract by making the contract design problem
comparable to that in chapter 2. I will later show that there is a contract that
satisfies these restrictions and results in the first best quantity scheme and
expected profit scheme.
First, I assume that the government offers a contract in which the message
spaces are the set of types and the set of outcomes of the audit (θ˜ ∈ Θ and
s˜ ∈ S). Second, I assume that the government offers a contract that is truthful
(θ˜ = θ and s˜ = s) and for which bribery does not take place (b(s, s) = 0 and
sˆ(s, s) = s). I then consider a contract in which the government requests
an arbitrarily high reimbursement from the firm when its claim about the
outcome of the audit does not coincide with the report of the internal auditor
(rF (θ˜, s˜, sˆ) = ∞ if sˆ 6= s˜). I also restrict attention to a contract in which
the government requests a reimbursement from the internal auditor that is
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not contingent on its report. With these simplifications I can write the
contract that the government offers to the firm and the internal auditor as{
q(θ˜), tF (θ˜), rF (θ˜, s˜), tA(θ˜), rA(θ˜, s˜)
}
, where the firm pays the reimbursement
rF (θ˜, s˜) if its claim about the outcome of the audit coincides with the report
of the internal auditor.
The payoff of the government with a truthful contract for which bribery
does not take place is:
Ef(θ)
{
Uq((θ))− tF (θ) +
∑
s∈S
rF (θ, s)g(s | θ) (3.6)
−tA (θ) +
∑
s∈S
rA(θ, s)g(s | θ)
}
I now focus on the side contract. The internal auditor reports truthfully
whenever it rejects the side contract to avoid paying a penalty. The firm then
makes a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit to avoid paying an
arbitrarily high reimbursement. Therefore, after the firm claims that its type
is θ˜ and the outcome of the internal audit is s, the payoff of the internal auditor
if it rejects the side contract is tA(θ˜)− rA(θ˜, s).
In any optimal side contract the firm requests a report equal to its
claim about the outcome of the audit (sˆ(s, s˜) = s˜) as otherwise it pays an
arbitrarily high reimbursement. As a result, in any optimal side contract
the internal auditor pays an expected penalty hPA if the claim of the firm
about the outcome of the audit differs from the truth (s˜ 6= s). Therefore,
after the firm claims that its type is θ˜, the outcome of the internal audit
is s and the firm claims that it is s˜, the payoff of the internal auditor is
tA(θ˜) + b(s, s)− rA(θ˜, s) if s˜ = s and tA(θ˜) + b(s, s˜)− rA(θ˜, s˜)−hPA otherwise.
In consequence, in any optimal side contract the firm pays a zero bribe if
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it makes a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit (b(s, s) = 0 if
s˜ = s, bribery does not take place) and a bribe equal to the difference in
the reimbursement plus the expected penalty that the internal auditor pays
otherwise (b(s, s˜) = rA(θ˜, s˜)− rA(θ˜, s) + hPA if s˜ 6= s).
I refer to a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit as bribery not
taking place. After the firm claims that its type is θ, when the outcome of the
internal audit is s bribery does not take place if:
rF (θ, s) ≤ rF (θ, s˜) + rA(θ, s˜)− rA(θ, s) + hPA + hPF ∀s˜ 6= s (3.7)
If this condition holds for all the types of the firm and all the outcomes of
the audit then the firm prefers to make a truthful claim when its type is θ if:
tF (θ)−
∑
s∈S
rF (θ, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ (3.8)
tF (θ˜)−
∑
s∈S
rF (θ˜, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
The firm and the internal auditor accept the contract if:
piF (θ) = tF (θ)−
∑
s∈S
rF (θ, s)g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 (3.9)
piA(θ) = tA(θ)−
∑
s∈S
rA(θ, s)g(s | θ) ≥ 0 (3.10)
An optimal truthful contract for which bribery does not take place
maximises (3.6) subject to (3.7) for all θ and all s and (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10)
for all θ.
3.4.2 Alternative statement of the problem
I next perform a change in variables that provides more intuition into the
contract design problem and facilitates its comparison with that in chapter 2.
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I consider a contract
{
q(θ˜), piF (θ˜), rF (θ˜, s˜), piA(θ˜), rA(θ˜, s˜)
}
. The transfers
that the firm and the internal auditor obtain are given by (3.9) and (3.10)
respectively.
After this change in variables I can write (3.6) as:
Ef(θ) {U(q(θ))− C(θ, q(θ))− piF (θ)− piA(θ)} (3.11)
and (3.8) becomes:
piF (θ) ≥ piF (θ˜) +
∑
s∈S
rF (θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
+ (3.12)
+C(θ˜, q(θ˜))− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
while (3.9) and (3.10) are simply:
piF (θ) ≥ 0 (3.13)
piA(θ) ≥ 0 (3.14)
An optimal truthful contract for which bribery does not take place
maximises (3.11) subject to (3.7) for all θ and all s and (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14)
for all θ. The contract design problem presents two differences with respect to
that in chapter 2. First, it is as if the government faces an additional cost: the
expected profit of the internal auditor. Second, the constraint that guarantees
that bribery does not take place (equation (3.7)) differs from the equivalent
constraint in chapter 2 (equation (2.6)) in that it contains the difference in the
reimbursement that the internal auditor pays.
3.4.3 An optimal contract
The crucial observation to characterise an optimal contract with ex post side
contracting is that the constraint that bribery does not take place is in fact
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a constraint on the range of the sum of the reimbursements. To see this, it
suffices to write (3.7) as:
rF (θ, s) + rA(θ, s) ≤ rF (θ, s˜) + rA(θ, s˜) + hPA + hPF ∀s˜ 6= s (3.15)
and follow the same logic as in Lemma 1.
Making use of this observation, Proposition 4 characterises an optimal
contract both for the case of two cost types and for the case of a continuum
of cost types:
Proposition 4. A reimbursement scheme of the internal auditor for which
bribery does not take place is given by:
rA(θ, s) = −rF (θ, s) + ρ(θ, s) (3.16)
where the range of ρ(θ, s) for the outcome of the audit (max
s∈S
ρ(θ, s) −
min
s∈S
ρ(θ, s)) is smaller or equal than the sum of the expected penalties for
all the types of the firm.
For the case of two cost types if the value of the audit is positive then in an
optimal contract the firm and the internal auditor make a zero expected profit
(piF (θ) = 0 and piA(θ) = 0) and the government demands the first best quantity
(q(θ) = qFB(θ)) for both types of the firm. The reimbursement scheme of the
firm is given by:
rF (θ, s) =

ψ φ(q
FB(θ))
V
if g(s | θ)− g(s | θ) < 0
0 if g(s | θ)− g(s | θ) ≥ 0
(3.17)
For the case of a continuum of cost types if the value of the audit is
positive for all the types of the firm then in an optimal contract in the relaxed
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problem the firm and the internal auditor make a zero expected profit and the
government demands the first best quantity for all the types of the firm. The
reimbursement scheme of the firm is given by:
rF (θ, s) =

ψ φ(θ,q
FB(θ))
V (θ) if
dg(s|θ)
dθ
< 0
0 if dg(s|θ)
dθ
≥ 0
(3.18)
If the audit has the monotonicity property, the value of the audit is non
increasing and the cost of production is convex in θ then this is an optimal
contract.
In the reimbursement scheme of the internal auditor in (3.16) the
government gives the internal auditor the reimbursement that the firm pays
(−rF (θ, s)) and it requests an amount ρ(θ, s). The sum of the reimbursements
is then ρ(θ, s). As this has a range for the outcome of the audit smaller or
equal than the sum of the expected penalties it then follows from Lemma 1
that bribery does not take place.
The construction of the reimbursement scheme of the internal auditor in
(3.16) is possible for any reimbursement scheme of the firm. In an optimal
contract for every type of the firm the government pays the internal auditor
a transfer equal to the expected reimbursement that the internal auditor pays
so its expected payoff is zero. The contract design problem is then as in
chapter 2 but with no constraint on the range of the reimbursement of the
firm. For the case of two cost types the reimbursement scheme of the firm
in (3.17) achieves the first best quantity scheme and expected profit scheme
if the value of the audit is positive. For the case of a continuum of cost
types the reimbursement scheme of the firm in (3.18) achieves the first best
quantity scheme and expected profit scheme in the relaxed problem if the value
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of the audit is positive for all θ.4 It then follows from Proposition 3 that an
optimal contract in the relaxed problem is an optimal contract if the remaining
assumptions in Proposition 4 are satisfied.5
It is worth pointing out that Proposition 4 holds if the internal auditor does
not observe the type of the firm. In that situation the internal auditor has a
belief about the type of the firm that it uses to determine its expected payoff
from accepting the contract that the government offers. For the contract in
Proposition 4 this belief does not play a role in the decision of accepting the
contract as for any type of the firm the internal auditor makes a zero expected
profit.
3.5 An optimal contract with ex ante side
contracting
3.5.1 Ex post versus ex ante side contracting
I begin this section by showing that with ex ante side contracting the contract
in Proposition 4 might result in bribery and as a result fail to achieve the first
best quantity scheme and expected profit scheme. I consider a side contract
with a bribe b(θ, θ˜, s, s) = rA(θ˜, s) − tA(θ˜) and a report sˆ(θ, θ˜, s, s) = s for
all s. That is, when its type is θ, the firm claims that its type is θ˜ and for all
the outcomes of the audit it makes a truthful claim (s˜ = s), it requests the
4Proposition 4 is valid if the value of the audit is zero because the sum of the expected
penalties is zero. Unlike the situation in which the sum of the expected penalties is positive,
this is however a knife edge result that is due to my assumption that when the firm is
indifferent between bribing an not bribing the internal auditor it chooses the latter.
5The condition in Proposition 2 given in (2.32) is not necessary as the government
achieves the outcome of the first best contract. The assumption in subsection 2.6.1 that the
hazard rate is non decreasing and the assumption in Proposition 3 that the marginal cost
of production is convex in θ are also not necessary as its unique role is to ensure that the
second best quantity is non increasing.
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internal auditor to report truthfully and it pays the internal auditor a bribe
equal to the reimbursement that the internal auditor pays minus the transfer
that it receives. The payoff of the internal auditor is then zero for all the
outcomes of the audit. Therefore its expected payoff is zero so it accepts the
side contract.6
The expected payoff of the firm when its type is θ and it offers the above
side contract is given by:
tF (θ˜)−
∑
s∈S
rF (θ˜, s)g(s | θ)−
∑
s∈S
rA(θ˜, s)g(s | θ) + tA(θ˜)− C(θ, qFB(θ˜)) (3.19)
For the contract in Proposition 4 the transfers tF (θ˜) and tA(θ˜) are given
by (3.9) and (3.10) with θ = θ˜, piF (θ˜) = 0 and piA(θ˜) = 0. The expected payoff
of the firm when its type is θ is then:
∑
s∈S
rF (θ˜, s)g(s | θ˜) + C(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))−
∑
s∈S
rF (θ˜, s)g(s | θ) (3.20)
−∑
s∈S
rA(θ˜, s)g(s | θ) +
∑
s∈S
rA(θ˜, s)g(s | θ˜)− C(θ, qFB(θ˜))
which using (3.16) is simply:
∑
s∈S
ρ(θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
+ C(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))− C(θ, qFB(θ˜)) (3.21)
For the contract in Proposition 4 if bribery does not take place then the
expected profit of the firm is zero. Therefore the firm does not offer the side
contract under consideration when its type is θ if:
0 ≥∑
s∈S
ρ(θ˜, s)
(
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
+ (3.22)
+C(θ˜, qFB(θ˜))− C(θ, qFB(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
6This is true for any type of the firm and any claim of the firm about it. Therefore the
assumption that the internal auditor observes the type of the firm does not play a role here.
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Equation (3.22) is the same as (2.10) for the first best quantity scheme and
expected profit scheme replacing ρ(θ, s) with r(θ, s). Also, the constraint on
the range of ρ(θ, s) in Proposition 4 is the same as that on the range of r(θ, s)
in Lemma 1. It then follows from Proposition 1 that for the case of two cost
types the firm does not offer the side contract under consideration only if the
value of the audit is sufficiently high (V ≥ φ(qFB(θ))). For the said reason it
follows from Proposition 2 that the same is true only if the value of the audit
for type θ is sufficiently high for all the types of the firm (V (θ) ≥ φ(θ, qFB(θ))
for all θ).
3.5.2 Statement of the problem
I now start the characterisation of the contract design problem with ex ante
side contracting considering the side contract. The assumption that the
internal auditor observes the type of the firm makes it unnecessary to obtain
the expect payoff of the internal auditor if it rejects the side contract: whatever
this expected payoff is in an optimal ex ante side contract the firm pays an
expected bribe such that the expected payoff of the internal auditor is the
same as if it rejects the side contract.7 The contract design problem is then as
if the firm selects its claims and the report of the internal auditor to maximise
the sum of their expected payoffs.
The claims and the report that the firm selects with ex ante side contracting
depend on the sum of the transfers and the sum of the reimbursements but not
on how they add up. Therefore for any optimal contract there is an alternative
optimal contract in which the firm receives the transfer of the internal auditor
and pays its reimbursement. In other words, with ex ante side contracting it
7If the internal auditor did not observe the type of the firm then the firm and the internal
auditor would be in an informed principal, uninformed agent situation. It is well known
that this situation might result in a multiplicity of optimal side contracts, some of which
are coalitionally inefficient (see Maskin and Tirole (1992)).
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is optimal for the government to offer the internal auditor a non contingent
contract.
In an optimal side contract of a non contingent contract for the internal
auditor the firm pays the internal auditor an expected bribe equal to the
expected penalty that the internal auditor pays.8 The contract design problem
is then as in chapter 2: for every outcome of the audit it is as if the firm controls
the report of the internal auditor at a cost of misreporting equal to the sum of
the expected penalties. Therefore, it follows from subsection 2.4.1 that there is
an optimal contract
{
q(θ˜), tF (θ˜), rF (θ˜, s˜), sˆ(θ˜, s˜)
}
in which the message spaces
are the set of types and the set of outcomes of the audit (θ˜ ∈ Θ and s˜ ∈ S)
and in which the government makes a recommendation to the firm about what
report to request from the internal auditor (sˆ(θ˜, s˜)). Furthermore, this contract
is truthful (θ˜ = θ and s˜ = s) and obedient (sˆ = sˆ(θ˜, s˜)).
In subsection 2.4.1 I discussed the interpretation of the recommendation. I
then claimed that, with the information structure of the external auditor that
I have assumed, there is an optimal truthful contract for which the government
recommends that the firm requests a truthful report from the internal auditor
for all the types of the firm and all the outcomes of the audit (sˆ(θ, s) = s for
all θ and all s). I next stated the contract design problem using this result
and referring to a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit as bribery
not taking place. I now state the contract design problem without this result,
reserving the qualifier “bribery does not take place” for when the government
recommends that the firm requests a truthful report from the internal auditor.
The payoff of the government in a truthful contract is given by:
Ef(θ)
{
Uq((θ))− tF (θ) +
∑
s∈S
rF (θ, s)g(s | θ)
}
(3.23)
8In this sentence the expected penalty is both over the report of the external auditor and
over the outcome of the audit.
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After the firm claims that its type is θ, when the outcome of the internal
audit is s the firm prefers to make a truthful claim about it if:
rF (θ, s) + 1sˆ(θ,s)6=sψ ≤ rF (θ, s˜) + 1sˆ(θ,s˜)6=sψ ∀s˜ 6= s (3.24)
If this condition holds for all the types of the firm and all the outcomes of
the audit then the firm prefers to make a truthful claim about its type when
its type is θ if:
tF (θ)−
∑
s∈S
(
rF (θ, s) + 1sˆ(θ,s) 6=sψ
)
g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ (3.25)
tF (θ˜)−
∑
s∈S
(
rF (θ˜, s) + 1sˆ(θ˜,s) 6=sψ
)
g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
and accepts the contract if:
piF (θ) = tF (θ)−
∑
s∈S
(
rF (θ, s) + 1sˆ(θ,s)6=sψ
)
g(s | θ)− C(θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 (3.26)
An optimal contract maximises (3.23) subject to (3.24) for all θ and all s
and (3.25) and (3.26) for all θ.
3.5.3 Alternative statement of the problem
I next perform a change in variables that provides more intuition into the
contract design problem and facilitates its comparison with that in chapter 2.
I consider a contract
{
q(θ˜), piF (θ˜), rF (θ˜, s˜), sˆ(θ˜, s˜)
}
. The transfer that the firm
obtains is given by (3.26).
After this change in variables I can write (3.23) as:
Ef(θ)
{
Uq((θ))− C(θ, q(θ))− piF (θ)−
∑
s∈S
1sˆ(θ,s)6=sψg(s | θ)
}
(3.27)
and (3.25) becomes:
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piF (θ) ≥ piF (θ˜) +
∑
s∈S
(
rF (θ˜, s) + 1sˆ(θ˜,s)6=sψ
) (
g(s | θ˜)− g(s | θ)
)
+ (3.28)
+C(θ˜, q(θ˜))− C(θ, q(θ˜)) ∀θ˜ 6= θ
while (3.26) is simply:
piF (θ) ≥ 0 (3.29)
An optimal contract maximises (3.27) subject to (3.24) for all θ and all s
and (3.28) and (3.29) for all θ. The contract design problem presents three
differences with respect to that in chapter 2. First, from (3.28) it follows
that the government has an additional instrument, the “bribery scheme”, to
prevent the firm when its type is a particular θ to claim that its type is a
particular θ˜ : the government can offer a contract for which bribery takes
place when the type of the firm is θ˜ for outcomes of the audit that are more
likely to occur when the type of the firm is θ than when it is θ˜ (sˆ(θ˜, s) 6= s if
g(s | θ˜)−g(s | θ) < 0). Second, (3.24) shows that the use that the government
makes of this instrument affects the use that it can make of the reimbursement
scheme: the firm makes a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit if and
only if the reimbursement that it pays plus the sum of the expected penalties
when bribery takes place is not greater than when it makes a false claim.
Third, (3.27) makes it clear that this instrument is costly for the government:
for any type of the firm, given the expected profit, quantity and expected
reimbursement, the higher is the expected (over the outcome of the audit)
sum of the expected penalties the higher is the transfer that the government
pays (see (3.26)).
3.5.4 An optimal contract
I finally address the question of why bribery does not take place in an optimal
contract. The approach that I take consists of comparing the optimal quantity
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scheme and expected profit scheme that the government can achieve in a
contract for which bribery takes place with the corresponding schemes in a
contract for which bribery does not take place. Proposition 5 presents the
result of this comparison:
Proposition 5. If the sum of the expected penalties does not depend on
the extent of the misreporting then the government can achieve the optimal
quantity scheme and expected profit scheme of a contract for which bribery
takes place with a contract for which bribery does not take place. An optimal
contract is then given by Proposition 1 for the case of two cost types and by
Propositions 2 and 3 for the case of a continuum of cost types.
Proposition 5 states that in the model under consideration the government
does not benefit from having an additional instrument to prevent the firm from
making a false claim about its type. In other words, any quantity scheme and
expected profit scheme that the government can achieve through the joint use
of the reimbursement scheme and the bribery scheme the government can also
achieve them through the use of the reimbursement scheme alone. As bribery
is costly for the government, it is then optimal for the government to deter it.
To understand the logic behind Proposition 5, consider a reimbursement
scheme in a contract for which bribery does not take place that consists of
the reimbursement scheme in the optimal contract for which bribery takes
place plus the sum of the expected penalties when bribery takes place. By
construction, the firm pays the same expected amount in the two contracts
when it makes a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit. Therefore,
conditional on the firm making a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit,
the quantity scheme and the expected profit scheme that the government can
achieve are the same in the two contracts. The question is then whether the
firm makes a truthful claim about the outcome of the audit in the contract
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for which bribery does not take place if it does so in the optimal contract for
which bribery takes place. The answer is positive due to the fact that in the
contract for which bribery does not take place if the firm makes a false claim
about the outcome of the audit then it pays the reimbursement in the contract
for which bribery takes place plus at least the sum of the expected penalties.
It is worth mentioning that Proposition 5 holds regardless of the the
distribution of the outcome of the audit and of the belief of the government
about the type of the firm. The constraints that the firm makes a truthful
claim about about the outcome of the audit and about its type (equations
(3.24) and (3.28)) do not depend on these functions and as a result neither
does Proposition 5.
3.6 Conclusions and extensions
In this chapter I began by arguing that when side contracting takes place
ex post the government prevents bribery by giving the internal auditor the
reimbursement that the firm pays. This is not costly for the government
as in an optimal contract for every type of the firm the government pays
the internal auditor a transfer equal to the expected reimbursement that the
internal auditor pays. The government can then achieve the outcome of the
first best contract both for the case of two cost types and for the case of a
continuum of cost types in the relaxed problem if the value of the audit is
positive (for all the types of the firm in the latter case).
I also argued in this chapter that when side contracting take place ex
ante and the internal auditor observes the type of the firm it is optimal
for the government to offer the internal auditor a non contingent contract.
I then proved that if the sum of the expected penalties that the firm and
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the internal auditor pay is independent of the extent of the misreporting
then the government can achieve the optimal quantity scheme and expected
profit scheme of a contract for which bribery takes place with a contract for
which bribery does not take place. In that situation it is then optimal for the
government to deter bribery regardless of the distribution of the outcome of
the audit and of the belief of the government about the type of the firm.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) considered a principal and agent
procurement model with auditing in which the agent has a privately known
marginal cost of production (its type) that takes a continuum of possible
values. They assumed that the audit results in a signal that has a one
to one relationship with the type of the agent. They allowed the agent to
distort the signal by performing a costly action before the principal observes
a report about it. They then demonstrated that misreporting takes place in
an optimal contract if there is no fixed cost of misreporting and the variable
cost is convex. I did not assume that the outcome of the audit has a one to
one relationship with the type of the firm. Therefore, unlike them, I could
not simplify the characterisation of an optimal contract with ex ante side
contracting by restricting attention to a reimbursement that is arbitrarily high
when the claims of the firm about its type and about the outcome of the audit
do not coincide. I was nevertheless able to prove that if the cost of misreporting
(the sum of the expected penalties) is fixed then misreporting (bribery) does
not take place in an optimal contract.
Bac and Kucuksenel (2006) emphasised the distinction between ex post and
ex ante side contracting. They considered a principal, supervisor and agent
model in which the agent has a privately known productivity (its type) that
takes two possible values. They assumed that the supervisor has a positive
monitoring cost and defined the ex ante side contract as a bribe in exchange
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for the commitment of the supervisor to not monitor. They found that if
monitoring costs are small and the probability of detection is large then
the optimal contract with ex post side contracting is optimal with ex ante
side contracting. With a different definition of ex ante side contracting and
assuming that auditing is costless I found that ex ante side contracting leads
to a strictly worse outcome for the government than ex post side contracting
unless the audit is sufficiently informative of the type of the firm or the sum
of the expected penalties is sufficiently high.
The assumption that the internal auditor observes the type of the firm
helped me to characterise an optimal contract with ex ante side contracting
by making it optimal for the government to offer the internal auditor a non
contingent contract. There is research on auditing and bribery which does
not make this assumption (see Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort (2003)
and Celik (2009)). The focus of this research is on characterising how the
government can exploit the transaction costs that the firm and the internal
auditor have due to the asymmetry of information between them. The issue
of bribery is dealt with by assuming that the outcome of the audit takes two
possible types, a situation in which the sum of the expected penalties trivially
does not depend on the extent of the misreporting as there is only one possible
misreport.9
In the characterisation of an optimal contract with ex ante side contracting
I also used the assumption that the sum of the expected penalties does not
depend on the extent of the misreporting. This assumption is not related to
whether the government receives some or all of the penalties that the firm and
9Che and Kim (2006) study optimal contracting with multiple colluding agents that are
asymmetrically informed. They provide conditions under which collusion imposes no cost
for the principal without assuming that the information of any of the contracting parties
take two possible values. Those conditions involve more than two colluding parties so they
are not valid for the analysis of side contracting between a firm and an internal auditor.
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the internal auditor pay (which seems realistic when penalties are monetary
fines) so my results do not change in that situation. My analysis can also easily
accommodate an extension in which I assume that the sum of the expected
penalties depends on the outcome of the audit, an assumption which might
reflect that the external auditor finds it easier to detect misreporting for some
outcomes of the audit than for others. In that scenario bribery is not optimal
and my results are identical with a suitably redefined value of the audit. How
my results vary with more general assumptions on the information structure
of the external auditor and on the penalties that the firm and the internal
auditor remains an open question.
Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 4) Equations (3.11) and (3.14) give that in an optimal
contract piA(θ) = 0 for all θ. Equations (3.11) and (3.13) give that if (3.15)
and (3.12) are not constraints then in an optimal contract piF (θ) = 0 and
q(θ) = qFB(θ) for all θ.
The reimbursement scheme of the firm in (3.17) satisfies (3.12) with
piF (θ) = 0 and q(θ) = qFB(θ) for all θ ∈
{
θ, θ
}
if g(s | θ) − g(s | θ) 6= 0
for some s. The reimbursement scheme of the firm in (3.18) satisfies (2.25)
with piF (θ) = 0 and q(θ) = qFB(θ) for all θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
if dg(s|θ)
dθ
6= 0 for some s
and all θ. From the proof of Proposition 3 the reimbursement scheme of the
firm in (3.18) satisfies (3.12) for all θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
if the audit has the monotonicity
property, the value of the audit is non increasing and the cost of production
is convex in θ (see θFB = θ).
Replacing (3.16) in (3.15) and using Lemma 1 and the definition of ρ(θ, s)
in Proposition 4 gives that any rF (θ, s) satisfies (3.15) for all θ and all s. This
completes the proof.
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Proof. (Proposition 5) Suppose that there is an optimal contract
{
q0(θ˜), pi0(θ˜),
r0(θ˜, s˜), sˆ0(θ˜, s˜)
}
that satisfies (3.24) for all θ and all s, (3.28) and (3.29) for
all θ and sˆ0(θ, s) 6= s for some θ and some s such that g(s | θ) > 0.10 I can
construct the alternative contract
{
qA(θ˜), piA(θ˜), rA(θ˜, s˜), sˆA(θ˜, s˜)
}
as follows:
qA(θ˜) = q0(θ˜) and piA(θ˜) = pi0(θ˜) for all θ˜ and rA(θ˜, s˜) = r0(θ˜, s˜) + 1sˆ0(θ˜,s˜)6=s˜ψ
and sˆA(θ˜, s˜) = s˜ for all θ˜ and all s˜.
Replacing rA(θ˜, s˜) and sˆA(θ˜, s˜) in (3.24) gives:
r0(θ, s) + 1sˆ0(θ,s) 6=sψ ≤ r0 (θ, s˜) + 1sˆ0(θ,s˜)6=s˜ψ + ψ ∀s˜ 6= s (3.30)
The left hand side of (3.30) is the same as that of (3.24) for the initial
contract whereas the right hand side is at least as high for all θ and all s.
Therefore the alternative contract satisfies (3.24) for all θ and all s.
Also, as rA(θ˜, s) + 1sˆA(θ˜,s) 6=sψ= r0(θ˜, s) + 1sˆ0(θ˜,s)6=sψ for all θ˜ and all s,
replacing qA(θ˜) and piA(θ˜) in (3.28) gives (3.28) for the initial contract for
all θ. Therefore the alternative contract satisfies (3.28) for all θ.
By construction, the alternative contract satisfies (3.29) for all θ.
Furthermore, replacing qA(θ˜), piA(θ˜) and sˆA(θ, s) in (3.27) gives a strictly
higher amount than (3.27) for the initial contract. Therefore the initial
contract is not optimal. This completes the proof.
10If g(s | θ) = 0 then the issue of bribery is irrelevant with a truthful contract.
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